Earlier Exits, Fewer Pleas:
A Randomized Controlled Trial of Prosecutor-Office Organization

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Abstract

Prosecutor offices process many lower-severity cases that may not merit prosecution, but line prosecutors carrying large caseloads often must triage urgent matters, leaving substantive review until days or weeks after arrest. Working with South Carolina's Ninth Judicial Circuit Solicitor's Office (SOL9), we conducted a randomized controlled trial to evaluate a resource reorganization that added an intake screening unit specifically to review eligible cases before they entered the standard prosecution pipeline. Eligible lower-severity cases—71.5 percent of SOL9's incoming Charleston County cases during the study period—were assigned either to the office's usual vertical model, in which a line prosecutor handles a case from intake through disposition, or to the new screening unit. Screening increased office non-prosecution—prosecutorial dismissal or remand—within 60 days by 6.6 percentage points from a control mean of 1.5 percent. Further, screening reduced mean time-to-disposition at one year by roughly 14.1 days. Screening also reduced cumulative guilty pleas and plea dismissals by 4.3 percentage points at one year, with the gap emerging only after the first 200 days. By making substantive review possible at intake, the reorganization changed not only when cases were resolved, but whether marginal cases were filtered out early or carried forward into plea bargaining.

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1 Introduction

Despite popular attention to trials, most felony cases are resolved without one. In 2020, 84 percent of felony matters concluded by state prosecutors' offices were resolved through filing declinations or plea bargaining (17 and 67 percent, respectively), compared with 5 percent through bench or jury trials (Browne and Motivans, 2024). Prosecutors therefore exercise substantial discretion over the course of criminal cases through their decisions about whether to prosecute, which charges to pursue, and what plea agreements to offer (Pfaff, 2017). These decisions are made under substantial processing pressures, as prosecutors divide limited attention between incoming cases and existing dockets, often while managing backlogs (Biener, 2024; Borakove et al., 2025). When cases remain pending, defendants may face pretrial detention and repeated court appearances; detention itself can increase the likelihood of guilty pleas and convictions (Leslie and Pope, 2017; Heaton et al., 2017). The resulting criminal records can create lasting barriers to work, with field experiments documenting lower employer callback rates for otherwise comparable applicants with records (Pager, 2007; Agan and Starr, 2018). Evidence on alternatives to continued prosecution further underscores these stakes: non-prosecution of marginal nonviolent misdemeanor cases reduced subsequent criminal justice involvement in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, while diversion from felony conviction improved employment and reduced subsequent convictions among first-time felony defendants in Harris County, Texas (Agan et al., 2023; Mueller-Smith and Schnepel, 2021). We ask whether moving substantive review to the beginning of the prosecution process changes which cases proceed, how long they remain pending, and how they resolve.

A central but under-appreciated determinant of those outcomes is how prosecutor offices are organized. Offices may organize prosecution vertically, with one attorney or team retaining responsibility from intake through disposition; horizontally, with different attorneys responsible for successive stages; or through a combination of the two (Frederick and Stemen, 2012; Wright et al., eds, 2021). Vertical prosecution preserves continuity, accountability, and

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case-specific knowledge. But it also requires line prosecutors to triage new lower-severity cases while simultaneously preparing serious cases, appearing in court, and managing existing dockets. When these demands delay substantive review, cases may remain in the prosecution process for days or weeks before receiving close scrutiny. An alternative arrangement creates dedicated intake capacity: screening attorneys assess new referrals, dismiss legally insufficient or low-merit cases, divert or remand eligible matters, and route the remainder to line prosecutors (Jacoby, 1976; Jacoby, ed, 1980; Frederick and Stemen, 2012). Larger, higher-volume offices can more readily support dedicated intake units and other horizontal functions, while smaller offices may assign screening responsibility to attorneys who also perform other duties (Weimer, 1980; Jacoby et al., 1999). Specialization may improve throughput and concentrate attention on initial review, but handoffs can weaken continuity and diffuse responsibility for the eventual disposition. These tradeoffs connect longstanding concerns about screening and bargaining, institutional oversight, and the routines through which high-volume criminal dockets are processed (Wright and Miller, 2002; Barkow, 2009; Kohler-Hausmann, 2014). The practical policy question is how best to combine vertical continuity and horizontal specialization to improve efficiency and fairness. We examine one margin of that question: adding dedicated intake review to an otherwise vertical prosecution process.

Identifying the causal effects of organizational structure is difficult because that structure is endogenous. Offices choose how to organize prosecution in response to caseloads, crime mix, staffing, court congestion, political priorities, and local economic conditions. Those same factors can independently affect case outcomes. A comparison of vertically and horizontally organized offices may therefore attribute differences to organizational structure that instead reflect the conditions that led offices to adopt those structures. Existing research has examined internal charging policies and reasons for declining prosecution (Miller and Wright, 2008), compared screening decisions with predictions of subsequent rearrest (Amaranto et al., 2018), and studied prosecutors' responses to defendant characteristics through

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randomized vignettes and quasi-random assignment of actual cases (Robertson et al., 2019; Sloan, 2026). More recent work links prosecutors' beliefs about future crime to incarceration decisions and subsequent violent rearrest, documents variation across prosecutors in their effects on racial disparities, and shows the importance of daily case-management practices (Harrington et al., 2026; Harrington and Shaffer, 2026; Graef and Ouss, 2026). These studies establish the importance of prosecutorial judgment, internal policies, and operational practices. Our design adds a randomized comparison of dedicated intake screening and typical vertical prosecution within the same office, allowing us to estimate the effects of assignment to the screening workflow without relying on comparisons across jurisdictions that selected different organizational structures.

We study this question through a preregistered randomized controlled trial conducted with the Solicitor's Office for South Carolina's Ninth Judicial Circuit (SOL9), which prosecutes felony and gross-misdemeanor cases in Charleston and Berkeley counties.[1] The experiment took place in Charleston County. Eligible defendants were assigned using the last digit of an anonymized defendant identifier: even digits assigned their cases to a new screening unit, while odd digits assigned them to the office's usual vertical prosecution workflow. The screening unit consisted of two part-time former SOL9 prosecutors who reviewed incident reports and criminal histories under written guidelines and decided whether to decline prosecution at intake, either by dismissing the case or by remanding it to a lower court (i.e., "non-prosecution").[2] Cases that screeners did not dismiss or remand returned to the ordinary prosecution workflow; this was not a decision to prosecute, only that the screener had not declined the case on the limited information available at intake, and the assigned line prosecutor retained full discretion over how to proceed. Eligibility required referral by one of

[1]The evaluation was preregistered on the Open Science Framework before outcomes were analyzed (Braman et al., 2023). Prespecifying outcomes and planned analyses limits opportunities for data-dependent specification choices and selective reporting, while providing a benchmark for distinguishing planned tests from subsequent exploration (Olken, 2015). The preregistered primary outcomes were dismissal within 60 days of arrest and time to disposition.

[2]We consider remands "non-prosecution" because, in this setting, the decision removes the case from the Solicitor's Office and limits the charge's maximum exposure to a simple misdemeanor. Remanded cases may continue in the lower court; we do not observe their final dispositions there.

WORKING PAPER

the county's four largest law enforcement agencies (93.9% of referred cases) and that every charge in the case was on the office-created screening list. Cases containing an off-list charge were excluded, and several drug-trafficking charges were removed from eligibility during implementation. Screening-eligible cases accounted for 71.5 percent of Charleston County referrals to SOL9 during the study period, with property, drug, and traffic offenses making up most of that docket. This population includes many defendants without prior convictions and plausibly contains individuals marginal to continued involvement in the criminal justice system, for whom prosecution may deepen future system contact (Agan et al., 2023). Our analysis includes 6,949 cases. Charleston County's population of approximately 408,000 in 2020 also provides evidence from a smaller jurisdiction than several prominent settings in the related literature.[3]

Our main results concern the two preregistered outcomes: dismissal within 60 days of arrest and time to disposition. First, assignment to screening increased the probability of dismissal within 60 days by 4.25 percentage points. Second, screening reduced the average time cases remained unresolved in SOL9 during the first year after arrest by 14.12 days. This duration estimate measures time pending within a common one-year horizon while accounting for cases that remained unresolved at the end of observation. We also examine remands, the other principal route through which screening removes cases from SOL9's caseload. Combining dismissals and remands, screening increased non-prosecution within 60 days by 6.57 percentage points from a control mean of 1.50 percent. Thus, for every hundred eligible cases assigned to screening, approximately seven additional cases exited the Solicitor's Office within the first 60 days.

Screening also changed later case resolutions. In exploratory analyses, assignment to

[3]The 2020 Census populations were 408,235 in Charleston County, 797,936 in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, 1,603,797 in Philadelphia County, and 4,731,145 in Harris County, Texas (U.S. Census Bureau, 2021). The latter three jurisdictions are the settings of Agan et al. (2023), Graef and Ouss (2026), and Mueller-Smith and Schnepel (2021), respectively. Charleston remains larger than the median prosecutor jurisdiction by population: BJS places 73.6 percent of offices in its population category below 100,000 (Browne and Motivans, 2024). Research settings can also be selected on institutional capacity and data availability, which may affect generalizability (Allcott, 2015). The setting therefore broadens the institutional contexts represented in the evidence without establishing national representativeness.

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screening reduced the probability of a guilty-plea disposition within one year by 3.22 percentage points. The reduction was 4.25 percentage points for the broader outcome that also includes cases dismissed as part of a plea agreement. These differences emerged later than the increase in early non-prosecution decisions, as cases in the control group continued toward resolution. The pattern is consistent with screening identifying and removing some cases that would otherwise have proceeded to plea bargaining. This connects the organization of early review to substantive case outcomes: dedicated intake screening affects both how long cases remain pending and the likelihood that they resolve through a plea during follow-up. The findings provide experimental evidence relevant to the screening–bargaining relationship emphasized in prior scholarship (Wright and Miller, 2002).

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting, intervention, randomization, and data. Section 3 presents the empirical framework. Section 4 reports effects on early case outcomes, time pending, and plea dispositions, together with heterogeneity analyses. Section 5 discusses implications for prosecutorial organization and the costs of prosecution.

WORKING PAPER

2 Setting, Experimental Design, and Data

2.1 Institutional setting and screening intervention

The Solicitor's Office for South Carolina's Ninth Judicial Circuit (SOL9) reviews and prosecutes felony and gross-misdemeanor cases in Charleston and Berkeley counties. Before the intervention, SOL9 used a vertical prosecution model: cases referred by law enforcement were assigned to line prosecutors, who retained responsibility through disposition. These prosecutors reviewed incoming cases alongside trial preparation, court appearances, and the management of existing dockets. SOL9 prosecutors did not conduct arraignments or initial bond hearings, and their first substantive review of a case often occurred weeks after arrest.

To provide earlier review of lower-severity cases, SOL9 introduced a dedicated screening unit staffed by two part-time attorneys, both former SOL9 prosecutors with at least three years of experience. Screeners reviewed eligible cases within days of receiving the law enforcement incident report, using that report and the defendant's criminal history. Following written intake guidelines, they decided whether to dismiss a case, remand it to a lower court, or return it to the ordinary prosecution workflow. For cases that proceeded, screeners could leave brief notes for the line prosecutor. Screeners also completed a short internal survey recording additional case information and the reasoning behind their decisions. These survey responses were not shared with downstream prosecutors and provide a basis for future research on prosecutorial decision-making.

WORKING PAPER

2.2 Eligibility, assignment, and implementation

The experiment was implemented in Charleston County, where staffing and technological capacity supported the randomized workflow. Eligible cases arose from arrests between May 1, 2023, and April 30, 2025, and were referred by one of four law enforcement agencies: the Charleston Police Department, North Charleston Police Department, Charleston County Sheriff's Office, and Mount Pleasant Police Department. Eligibility required that

every charge in a case appear on SOL9's screening list; cases containing any off-list charge were excluded. The list was specified before implementation and subsequently amended to remove several drug-trafficking charges. Screening-eligible cases accounted for 71.5 percent of Charleston County referrals to SOL9 during the study period. Appendix D provides the full charge list and screening guidelines.

Treatment was assigned at the defendant level using the last digit of an anonymized identifier in SOL9's case management system. Defendants with even final digits were assigned to screening, while those with odd final digits were assigned to the ordinary prosecution workflow. Assignment persisted across cases, so multiple eligible cases involving the same defendant retained the same original assignment. The office selected this rule to reduce the administrative burden of implementing the experiment within routine case processing.

Actual screening sometimes differed from initial assignment. Under the implemented co-defendant rule (Section C.2.2), an incident containing any defendant assigned to screening triggered screening for all co-defendants on that incident, including those initially assigned to ordinary handling. Line prosecutors also occasionally removed cases from the screening queue, and administrative routing errors produced additional departures. Among cases assigned to screening, 97.9 percent received screening, while 91.9 percent of control cases followed the ordinary prosecution workflow. We analyze cases according to their original defendant-level assignment, regardless of the workflow they subsequently received.

2.3 Data, outcomes, and sample characteristics

We use SOL9's administrative case management records covering January 1, 2017, through October 31, 2026. Records preceding the experiment provide criminal-history covariates, while records after the enrollment window allow us to follow experimental cases through disposition or the administrative cutoff. Of the 7,155 screening-eligible cases, we retain those involving defendants whose recorded sex is male or female and whose recorded race is Black or White. These restrictions exclude 206 cases, leaving an analysis sample of 6,949

WORKING PAPER

cases. Our main analyses use administrative cases as the unit of observation, while treatment assignment is fixed at the defendant level.

Our preregistered primary outcomes are non-plea dismissal within 60 days of arrest and time from arrest to final case disposition in SOL9 (Braman et al., 2023). We additionally examine remand within 60 days and a composite office non-prosecution outcome for non-plea dismissal or remand within that period, reporting both components separately. Cases resolved through a mixture of non-plea dismissals and remands are classified as remanded; they count toward both the 60-day remand and non-prosecution outcomes when all charges are resolved within 60 days of arrest. Section 3.4 describes the full disposition hierarchy. Remands remove cases from SOL9's docket, but we do not observe their subsequent lower-court dispositions. In the survival analyses, cases unresolved at the administrative cutoff are right-censored. Our exploratory plea analyses distinguish guilty pleas from plea dismissals. A global plea agreement can resolve multiple cases involving the same defendant: all charges in one case may be dismissed as part of an agreement in which the defendant pleads guilty in another connected case. Appendix A.2 discusses these linked resolutions and shows that aggregation to the defendant-case level does not substantively change our conclusions.

The eligible docket contains less severe cases than the ineligible Charleston docket: eligible cases are less likely to involve a felony, co-defendants, or a gun charge, while demographic characteristics are broadly similar. Appendix Table 22 provides the full comparison. Within the experimental sample, the screening and control groups are broadly similar on observed characteristics, although unadjusted comparisons show differences in gun-charge prevalence and the number of charges. Because comparisons across many baseline covariates can produce small p-values by chance even under random assignment, Table 1 reports both raw and Benjamini–Hochberg adjusted p-values, treating the balance comparisons as one hypothesis family. Appendix Figure 13 shows that the share of eligible cases assigned to screening remained close to one-half across months, providing suggestive evidence that treatment assignment was stable over time.

WORKING PAPER

Table 1: Balance table (intent-to-treat sample)

Covariate	Control	Treated	Mean Diff	Regr SE	Raw P-value	FDR P-value
Age (years)	36.59	36.59	0.00	0.41	0.99	0.99
Case Has Drug Charge	0.33	0.31	-0.02	0.01	0.24	0.86
Felony Case (at arrest)	0.65	0.64	-0.01	0.01	0.45	0.99
Case Has Gun Charge	0.15	0.13	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.09
Number of Case Charges	1.37	1.32	-0.05	0.02	0.02	0.19
Number of Defendants	1.16	1.16	-0.00	0.01	0.98	0.99
Gender (Female)	0.18	0.18	0.01	0.01	0.69	0.99
Gender (Male)	0.82	0.82	-0.01	0.01	0.69	0.99
No Prior Convictions	0.49	0.49	-0.01	0.02	0.74	0.99
1 Prior Conviction	0.12	0.12	0.00	0.01	0.99	0.99
2 Prior Convictions	0.10	0.09	-0.01	0.01	0.47	0.99
3 Prior Convictions	0.06	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.10	0.62
4 Prior Convictions	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.01	0.15	0.67
5-6 Prior Convictions	0.07	0.07	-0.01	0.01	0.54	0.99
7+ Prior Convictions	0.10	0.09	-0.01	0.01	0.44	0.99
Race (Black)	0.66	0.66	-0.00	0.02	0.96	0.99
Race (White)	0.34	0.34	0.00	0.02	0.96	0.99
Number of Victims	0.44	0.45	0.00	0.02	0.92	0.99

WORKING PAPER

3 Empirical Framework

3.1 Main ITT specifications

Our main estimates are intent-to-treat (ITT): cases remain coded by their initial assignment regardless of whether the assigned workflow was fully delivered. Section 2.2 reports adherence[4] to assigned workflows, and Appendix A presents treatment-on-treated analyses.

Our primary estimand is the intent-to-treat effect of assignment to screening. For the binary 60-day early outcomes (non-plea dismissal, remand, and the non-prosecution composite), we estimate linear probability models of the form

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta\,\text{AssignedScreening}_i + \gamma_{a(i)} + \delta_{q(i)} + \theta_{d(i)} + X_i'\lambda + \varepsilon_i,$$

where Y_i is the case-level outcome and $\text{AssignedScreening}_i$ indicates random assignment to the screening workflow. The fixed effects $\gamma_{a(i)}$, $\delta_{q(i)}$, and $\theta_{d(i)}$ absorb differences across arresting agencies, year-quarters (e.g., 2023Q3, 2023Q4), and days of the week respectively, accounting for systematic variation in intake and processing patterns. The vector X_i denotes pre-treatment controls described in Section 3.2. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the defendant level, the unit of assignment.

We present a stepwise specification progression in the main results: no fixed effects or controls; fixed effects only; and fixed effects plus controls. Because assignment is randomized, identification does not rely on covariate adjustment; we treat the FE-plus-controls specification as the preferred estimate because it is the most conservative and typically the most precise. We estimate heterogeneity through interactions in the full sample rather than separate subgroup regressions in order to preserve precision and maintain a common control structure across groups, following standard practice for regression adjustment in randomized experiments (Lin, 2013; Brookes et al., 2004).

[4]We use *adherence* rather than *compliance* in this section to avoid confusion with the principal-strata complier framework used later when we characterize marginal cases.

WORKING PAPER

3.2 Covariates and controls

The vector X_i comprises a compact set of pre-treatment controls chosen to improve precision and guard against any chance imbalances. These include defendant demographics (age at arrest, gender, race/ethnicity), (prior) pending arrest status, prior convictions, charge-type indicators, co-defendant counts, number of charges and other case-level characteristics. Criminal-history controls are drawn from administrative records and include indicators of prior convictions and related measures used in the screening workflow.

3.3 Time-to-disposition

To study how assignment changes the pace of case resolution, we analyze time-to-disposition in a survival framework. We first present Kaplan–Meier survival curves as a nonparametric description of the fraction of cases not yet disposed over time. We complement these curves with restricted mean survival time (RMST) summaries, which capture the average difference in case duration over fixed horizons and are often more interpretable than a single hazard ratio when effects are concentrated early in follow-up.

As a parametric check, we also estimate a Cox proportional hazards model with Efron ties and defendant-clustered robust standard errors. We treat unresolved cases as right-censored at the last date observed in the administrative extract (Section 2.3), ensuring that censoring reflects the data window rather than the timing of analysis.

3.4 Plea outcomes under competing risks

Plea outcomes require a different time-to-event framework because pleas are only one of several mutually exclusive ways a case can terminate. Cases may instead be dismissed (by plea, prosecutor, or judge), remanded, diverted, or end in another final disposition. In this setting, a standard Kaplan–Meier estimator would overstate plea incidence (guilty plea or plea dismissal) because it treats these competing exits as non-informative censoring. We

WORKING PAPER

therefore estimate cumulative incidence functions (CIFs) for pleas using the Aalen–Johansen estimator, which accumulates cause-specific transition probabilities over time and yields the probability that a case reaches a plea by a given horizon while correctly accounting for the fact that other dispositions remove cases from the risk set. We use these cumulative incidence functions as our primary descriptive estimand for plea behavior.

When charges within a case have different dispositions, we assign the case the first applicable category in the following order: guilty plea, conviction at trial, plea dismissal, remand to a lower court, diversion, dismissal by the prosecutor or judge, and other terminal disposition. For example, a case containing a guilty plea and plea dismissals is classified as a guilty plea, while a case containing only non-plea dismissals and remands is classified as remanded. This priority rule produces mutually exclusive case-level outcomes for the competing-risks analysis.

3.5 Inference and multiple testing

The paper analyzes two pre-registered outcomes: dismissal within 60 days of arrest and time-to-disposition. It also analyzes related early outcomes — remand within 60 days and the composite non-prosecution outcome (non-plea dismissal or remand within 60 days) — and an exploratory plea analysis. Heterogeneity is examined along several dimensions, including race, charge severity, and prior criminal history. To control for the resulting multiple-testing burden, we apply the Benjamini–Hochberg false discovery rate procedure within pre-specified hypothesis families: (i) baseline balance covariates, (ii) the main heterogeneity estimates for the three 60-day early outcomes, and (iii) additional exploratory analyses. We do not adjust across alternative robustness specifications of the same estimand; instead, we pre-specify a preferred specification and use auxiliary specifications to assess sensitivity. Appendix tables report additional robustness checks, including placebo tests, compliance-based analyses, and alternative outcome windows. We also report design-based randomization-inference checks for selected outcomes in the appendix.

WORKING PAPER

4 Results

This section presents intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates of assignment to prosecutorial screening on case trajectories. We begin with pre-registered effects on early case outcomes within 60 days of arrest—a horizon selected in consultation with the office and specified in the pre-analysis plan (Appendix C.2). We then examine overall time-to-disposition using survival methods that account for right-censoring. Next, we assess how office non-prosecution within the first 60 days of a case varies across pre-treatment subgroups. Finally, we present exploratory evidence on plea behavior using competing-risk methods. Appendix C.1 provides a complementary design-based characterization of the marginal cases whose prosecution status is shifted by screening.

4.1 Main Effects

We find across all ITT specifications that screening increases the probability of an office non-prosecution within the first 60 days after an arrest. Table 2 reports the effect of assignment to screening on the probability of a "speedy non-prosecution" within 60 days (Panel A), defined as a non-plea dismissal or remand to a lower court.[5] Panels B and C show the components of non-prosecution: non-plea dismissal and remand, respectively. In the preferred FE+controls specification, assignment to screening increases the probability of non-prosecution within 60 days by 6.57 percentage points, with corresponding increases in both non-plea dismissal (4.25 pp) and remand (2.32 pp). Because baseline rates of early non-prosecution are very low (1.50%), these percentage-point effects translate into large proportional changes relative to the control mean; we therefore emphasize levels (pp) and report percentage changes only as a secondary benchmark.

Substantively, the results imply that screening shifts a meaningful share of eligible cases out of the prosecution pipeline shortly after arrest, through both prosecutorial dismissals and remands. This early diversion can reduce expected punishment exposure and collateral

[5] Remanding to a lower court reduces the maximum punishment to a misdemeanor conviction.

WORKING PAPER

Table 2: Main ITT Effects on 60-Day Outcomes: Specification Progression

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A. Non-prosecution ≤60d (non-plea dismissal OR remand)			
Assigned to screening (pp)	6.75***	6.80***	6.57***
	(0.53)	(0.54)	(0.51)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Mean of outcome in untreated group (pp)	1.50	1.50	1.50
N	6949	6949	6949
R^2	0.025	0.033	0.084
F-stat	159.48	9.96	7.50
Fixed effects		✓	✓
Controls			✓
Panel B. Non-plea dismissal ≤60d			
Assigned to screening (pp)	4.36***	4.39***	4.25***
	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.43)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Mean of outcome in untreated group (pp)	1.21	1.21	1.21
N	6949	6949	6949
R^2	0.015	0.021	0.059
F-stat	96.54	6.60	5.11
Fixed effects		✓	✓
Controls			✓
Panel C. Remand ≤60d			
Assigned to screening (pp)	2.39***	2.41***	2.32***
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.29)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Mean of outcome in untreated group (pp)	0.28	0.28	0.28
N	6949	6949	6949
R^2	0.010	0.015	0.046
F-stat	63.49	3.76	2.44
Fixed effects		✓	✓
Controls			✓
Panel D. Disposed (all disposition types) ≤60d			
Assigned to screening (pp)	7.22***	7.26***	7.03***
	(0.66)	(0.65)	(0.63)
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Mean of outcome in untreated group (pp)	3.64	3.64	3.64
N	6949	6949	6949
R^2	0.020	0.027	0.063
F-stat	120.67	8.85	6.97
Fixed effects		✓	✓
Controls			✓

Notes: OLS ITT with SEs clustered at the defendant (assignment) level. Outcomes are indicators for events by the inclusive 60-day horizon. Non-prosecution includes non-plea dismissal or remand and excludes plea dismissal; disposed includes all disposition types, including plea dismissal. Each estimate block reports the coefficient on the first line, clustered SEs in parentheses on the second line, and FDR-corrected p-values (Benjamini-Hochberg) in brackets on the third line. Columns (2) and

WORKING PAPER

consequences relative to business-as-usual prosecution.

We next examine whether screening changes how long cases remain open. We study time-to-disposition using a survival framework that treats disposition as the terminal event and right-censors cases that remain pending at the end of the observation window. Figure 1 plots the survival curves by experimental group and the difference in survival probabilities (control minus treatment) with confidence intervals. The treated survival curve lies below the control curve, indicating faster disposition among cases assigned to screening (Figure 1a).


The gap opens sharply in the first 50 days — peaking at roughly 8 percentage points — then narrows steadily as the follow-up window extends (Figure 1b). This pattern indicates that screening's effect on case timing is concentrated almost entirely in the early lifecycle of a case: treatment cases are substantially more likely to have exited the system within the first 200 days. A complementary analysis of restricted mean survival time (RMST) captures this front-loading directly: assignment to screening reduces the expected time-to-disposition by approximately two weeks (Table 3), and as Fig. 1b makes clear, that two week average reduction reflects a large early acceleration rather than a uniform shift across the full case lifecycle.

Table 3: Time-to-Disposition: Multi-Horizon RMST Summary (ITT)


Horizon (days)	RMST Diff (Control − Treatment)	Bootstrap SE	95% CI Lower	95% CI Higher
365	14.12	3.36	7.83	20.63
180	9.30	1.18	7.07	11.65
730	17.90	7.68	3.24	33.35
Cox HR (>1 = faster disposition)	1.043 [0.981, 1.110]			
Cox HR SE	0.033			
N	6,949			
Events	5,599			

Notes: RMST differences are reported as Control - Treatment, so positive values indicate faster disposition under screening. Bootstrap confidence intervals are clustered at the defendant level. The Cox specification uses arrest-agency fixed effects with quarter and day-of-week strata plus the shared control set.

WORKING PAPER



(a) Kaplan–Meier (ITT): time to disposition



(b) Difference in KM survival (Control − Treatment) with 95% CI

Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Time to Disposition

WORKING PAPER


4.2 Heterogeneous Effects

To explore where screening is most and least effective, we estimate heterogeneity in 60-day outcomes using full-sample interaction models. To make the results easier to interpret, Figure 2 reports subgroup-specific ITT effects rather than treatment-by-subgroup deviations. For each heterogeneity family, the omitted-category effect is the coefficient on assignment to screening; effects for other subgroups are calculated as the assignment coefficient plus the relevant treatment-by-subgroup interaction. This preserves the precision and common control structure of full-sample interaction models while presenting the object of primary interest: the effect of screening within each subgroup.

Figure 2 reports subgroup-specific effects for dismissal and remand within 60 days, as well as the combined non-prosecution. Dashed vertical lines show the overall preferred ITT estimate for each outcome, and the solid vertical line marks zero. Confidence intervals are based on defendant-clustered standard errors using the full variance-covariance matrix for the relevant linear combination. We use the interaction terms to test whether subgroup-specific effects differ from the omitted category and apply false discovery rate (FDR) corrections to those interaction contrasts. The figure reports subgroup-specific treatment effects for interpretability, while Appendix Table 12 reports the corresponding interaction estimates, unadjusted p-values, and FDR-adjusted q-values.

Three patterns stand out. First, screening remains effective across many groups, but effects are smaller when cases are not isolated to a single defendant and incident. The non-prosecution effect is 7.06 pp for single-defendant cases but 3.05 pp for multi-defendant cases. Similarly, the effect is 8.11 pp for isolated cases but only 3.28 pp for defendants with pending matters. These patterns are consistent with an ownership or handoff problem: screening is most effective when cases can be evaluated and removed as stand-alone units, and less effective when decisions are entangled across co-defendants or across multiple matters tied to the same defendant. In that sense, the heterogeneity results reinforce the paper's broader organizational interpretation of vertical versus staged review (Wright and Miller,

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Points and 95% CIs show subgroup-specific ITT effects from full-sample interaction models. Omitted-category effects equal the treatment coefficient; non-reference effects equal the treatment coefficient plus the interaction term. Dashed lines show the preferred FE+controls ITT estimate for each outcome. FDR adjustment is applied to treatment-by-subgroup interaction tests. Confidence intervals around subgroup-specific treatment effects are not FDR-adjusted.

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Figure 2: Subgroup-specific ITT effects on 60-day outcomes


2002; Barkow, 2009; Frederick and Stemen, 2015).

Second, effects are attenuated in more serious cases. The non-prosecution effect is 9.14 pp for misdemeanor cases but 5.13 pp for felony cases, and the dismissal effect is 6.97 pp for misdemeanors but 2.73 pp for felonies. Gun and weapon cases show a related constraint on the remand margin: the remand effect is 2.70 pp for non-gun cases but essentially zero for gun or weapon cases. This likely reflects the fact that many gun charges cannot be remanded to a lower court for a less serious charge as well as the decriminalization from public carry laws.


Third, the figure does not support a simple story in which screening is uniformly more or less effective by race. The non-prosecution effect is 7.12 pp for White defendants and 6.29 pp for Black defendants, and the confidence intervals overlap. This aligns with the race-stratified time-to-disposition results below: the main heterogeneity appears to be driven less by race itself than case independence, case complexity, and defendant-level case context. Another explanation is that the non-prosecution aggregate is equivalent, but meaningful differences exist in the dismissal versus remand disposition dimension by race (Fig. 9).

The estimates above focus on early 60-day outcomes. We separately examine whether time-to-disposition effects differ by race using survival curves. Figure 3a plots Kaplan–Meier curves separately for Black and White defendants, and Figure 3b reports the difference in treatment effects by race over time. The overall pattern is consistent with broadly similar disposition-timing effects across race groups and we do not find significant differences between Black and White defendants in time-to-disposition.

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(a) Time-to-disposition by race: Kaplan–Meier curves



(b) Time-to-disposition by race: difference in treatment effects over time

Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier Race Comparison

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4.3 Plea behavior

We next examine whether screening changes plea behavior.[6] Although screening operates at intake, it may alter downstream resolution by expediting cases that would have exited via a (prosecutorial) dismissal or remand anyway, *and* by shifting marginal cases that would otherwise persist and resolve via plea bargaining. To study this margin, we treat guilty pleas and plea dismissals as a competing event alongside remands, diversions, (non-plea) dismissals, and other terminal outcomes, and estimate Aalen–Johansen cumulative incidence functions (CIFs) by assignment arm. Under competing risks, the CIF is a cumulative probability that reflects both transitions into making a plea and the rate at which other endpoints remove cases from the risk set, making it a transparent summary of how many cases result in a plea by a given horizon.


Figure 4a shows the estimated plea CIF by assignment. The treated curve lies below the control curve, indicating fewer guilty pleas among cases assigned to screening. Notably, the two curves track closely through approximately the first 200 days before diverging, consistent with the survival results above: the early lifecycle of a case is dominated by the non-prosecution effect, and the plea divergence emerges only after that initial window closes.

Figure 4b plots the difference in cumulative incidence (control minus treatment) with confidence intervals. Differences are small in the first 200 days, but by 1 year, the treatment group is 4.25 pp less likely to have pled (guilty plea or plea dismissal) with continued benefit over the observed period (Table 4). Similar effects are observed for each component plea disposition (guilty pleas and plea dismissals; Fig. 12; Tables 15 16).


This timing pattern suggests that screening is not just accelerating exits for cases that would have exited via dismissal or remand anyway. It also changes which cases survive long enough to plead guilty, reducing the number that ultimately reach a guilty plea. The plea divergence emerging at day 200 rather than immediately after arrest suggests that these are

[6] This subsection was not part of the original pre-analysis plan and is best interpreted as exploratory evidence that informs mechanism and interpretation of the main ITT effects.

WORKING PAPER



(a) Aalen–Johansen cumulative incidence of plea guilty or plea dismissal by assignment



(b) Difference in cumulative incidence of plea (control minus treatment) with 95% CI

Figure 4: Aalen–Johansen cumulative incidence of plea

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Table 4: AJ CIF Difference (Control - Treatment) for Plea (guilty plea or plea dismissal) at Key Horizons

Horizon (days)	CIF Diff (Control - Treatment)	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper
60	-0.0032	-0.0114	0.0048
180	0.0134	-0.0109	0.0363
365	0.0431	0.0141	0.0725
730	0.0502	0.0226	0.0814


cases that needed time in the prosecution pipeline before a plea became the path of least resistance. Because guilty pleas typically result in convictions and criminal records, this channel is materially important: avoiding convictions can reduce collateral consequences and may influence future prosecutorial discretion.[7]

When stratifying by race, the treatment and control curves appear to separate between six and fifteen months for Black defendants before reconverging, while no obvious separation is observed for White defendants (Figure 5). However, estimates of these differences over time are imprecise, and confidence intervals do not rule out similar cumulative effects by common horizons (bottom panel). We therefore interpret the timing contrast as descriptive rather than definitive. One plausible explanation is differential bargaining pressure and defense resources: if some groups face stronger incentives or constraints to resolve cases earlier through pleas, then shifting marginal cases from the prosecution pipeline may show up as an earlier reduction in plea incidence. Consistent with this interpretation, compliers differ by race in observable proxies for bargaining position—most notably the rate of private representation (Table 18). We treat these patterns as suggestive and return to their interpretation in the discussion.

Taken together, the plea evidence complements the earlier findings on non-prosecution and time-to-disposition. Screening does not merely speed early exits for cases that would have exited via prosecutorial dismissal or remand anyway; it also reduces the number of guilty pleas, shifting some marginal cases away from plea-based resolutions and toward earlier non-

[7]For evidence on the labor-market consequences of criminal records and convictions, see, e.g., Pager (2007), Agan and Starr (2018), and Mueller-Smith and Schnepel (2021).

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Figure 5: Race-specific plea effects (guilty pleas and plea dismissal). (top) Treatment differences by race. (bottom) Black-White difference for treatment effect.

prosecution. We return to the broader implications for plea bargaining and criminal record accumulation in the discussion.

4.4 Robustness

Appendix A reports robustness checks. Results are stable across alternative non-prosecution windows and alternative modeling choices for time-to-disposition; results are robust to different levels of case aggregation; results are robust to excluding multi-defendant incidents; placebo specifications show no spurious treatment effects in pre-period outcomes; treatment-on-treated effects using two-stage least squares yield similar results; and a comparison of functional forms. Taken together, these checks support the interpretation that the main findings reflect a causal effect of assignment to screening rather than specification artifacts.

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5 Discussion and Conclusion

The results show that adding a screening function to a largely vertical prosecutor's office changes both the timing and the composition of case outcomes. Screening increases early office non-prosecution decisions, reduces time-to-disposition, and lowers the cumulative plea probability at longer horizons. Taken together, these findings imply that intake review does more than accelerate the exit of cases that would likely have left the prosecution pipeline anyway. It also removes a set of marginal cases that would otherwise have remained active long enough to plead guilty.

The fact that cases disposed sooner overall and that the office made non-prosecution decisions faster affects defendants, victims, and the broader community. Trust in the criminal justice system was not assessed in this study, but future work could investigate how these improvements affect perceptions of the criminal justice system (Tyler, 2006).

The plea results are especially important for interpretation. If screening merely expedited dismissals and remands, we would not expect a sizable decline in later pleas. Instead, the evidence suggests that screening changes the composition of cases that remain in the system. Some cases in which "business-as-usual" processing would carry forward into bargaining are instead filtered out earlier. Our principal-strata comparisons in Appendix C.1 are suggestive rather than precise, but they point in the same direction of screening removing marginal cases that would otherwise resolve through plea bargaining. This reinforces the view that organizational design affects not only how fast cases move, but also who remains in the criminal justice system long enough to accumulate convictions. More broadly, the results are consistent with the view that screening and plea bargaining can operate as substitute organizational margins and is closely related to the screening/bargaining tradeoff emphasized by Wright and Miller (2002). In that sense, our findings suggest that introducing an intake-screening function changes not only how quickly cases move, but also where in the process and how cases are filtered out.

These changes matter both for the defendants and for the public. The non-prosecution

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and plea results together imply meaningful reductions in punishment exposure. Screening produced approximately 6.57 percentage points more early non-prosecutions and reduced cumulative pleas by 4.25 percentage points at one year—estimates that are precise and robust across specifications—resulting in an estimated reduction of 147 plea cases (111 guilty plea and 36 plea dismissal cases). Because pleas typically produce convictions with collateral consequences in employment, housing, and future involvement in the criminal-justice system, avoiding these outcomes has direct welfare implications for affected defendants.

Faster case resolution, especially non-prosecution, can preserve a person's liberty. Our estimates of pre-disposition and post-disposition incarceration, and probation, all show point estimate reductions from screening, but the estimated effect range for each includes zero (Appendix E).

The policy implication is therefore not that offices should abandon vertical prosecution altogether, but that many offices may benefit from a more deliberate hybrid structure. Vertical prosecution can preserve continuity and case knowledge, especially for serious matters (Wright et al., eds, 2021), but our findings suggest that it performs poorly when line prosecutors are unable to prioritize near real-time review of lower-severity cases. In that setting, less serious cases can consume scarce resources at the expense of attention to more serious matters while imposing avoidable burdens on lower-risk defendants. A dedicated intake-screening function offers one way to correct that misallocation. In that sense, the broader policy lesson is not whether offices should be purely vertical or purely horizontal, but whether they are using the right mix of continuity and staged review for the cases they handle. More broadly, the paper suggests that prosecutor-office organization is not just an administrative detail: it is a consequential policy margin that shapes who is punished, how much punishment they receive, and how much the system spends to produce those outcomes.

Our heterogeneity analysis does not support a simple story in which screening is uniformly more or less effective for one racial group than another. Conditional on entering the experimental sample, treatment effects on time-to-disposition and later guilty pleas are

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broadly similar across Black and White defendants, and the apparent differences in timing are not statistically precise. By contrast, we do detect meaningful heterogeneity along dimensions of case independence and complexity: effects are attenuated in multi-defendant incidents, among defendants with other open cases, and in some gun-related matters. That pattern suggests that the key margin is not race *per se*, but whether the case is practically amenable to early screening and diversion. This heterogeneity highlights an important boundary condition: intake review appears most valuable where weak or less serious cases can be separated cleanly from the rest of the docket, and less effective where screening decisions are legally or administratively entangled (Appendix Tables 12 and 13).

At the same time, race-neutral effects within the prosecutor's office need not imply race-neutral consequences in the population. Because Black defendants account for a disproportionately large share of arrests and of the office's eligible docket, even treatment effects that are broadly similar conditional on case entry imply larger aggregate effects for Black defendants. This is an important distributional point: reforms that reduce prosecution or conviction on average can still reduce cumulative costs more for groups that are disproportionately exposed to the criminal justice system upstream, especially because racial disparities are particularly pronounced in lower-severity and marginal cases, where screening is most likely to matter. In that sense, the racial incidence of screening operates not through sharply different treatment effects within the office, but through unequal exposure to the front end of the system itself. Appendix Table 24 makes this concrete: because Black defendants account for roughly two-thirds of the eligible docket, the implied aggregate reduction in costs is substantially larger for the Black community even though within-sample treatment effects are broadly similar. Appendix Table 25 further shows that this difference coincides with unequal upstream exposure to arrest and case entry, rather than with sharply different treatment effects inside the office.

The paper contributes evidence on the organization of prosecution as a policy choice. By comparing alternative workflows within the same office, we show that dedicating attorneys to

WORKING PAPER

early review can change the duration and disposition of cases. This complements evidence on the consequences of diversion and non-prosecution by examining an organizational process through which cases are selected for continued prosecution. It also raises a broader question about the persistence of institutional reforms. Stevenson (2023) emphasizes that stabilizing social forces can limit the durability and portability of effects from bounded criminal-justice interventions. One possibility is that changes to recurring decision processes produce more persistent effects than interventions that leave those processes intact. Dedicated screening offers a setting in which to examine that possibility because it changes who is responsible for reviewing successive cohorts of incoming cases. Our results establish effects on case processing during the study period in one prosecutor's office. Whether those effects persist as staffing and workloads change, and as police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys adjust their behavior, remains an important question for further research.

Future research should also examine longer-term outcomes for defendants, including recidivism, employment, and housing stability. In particular, one natural extension is to test whether the logic of *Misdemeanor Prosecution* carries over to the more severe felony and gross-misdemeanor cases studied here: if marginal defendants are screened out of prosecution earlier, do they also experience lower future criminal-system involvement in the years that follow (Agan et al., 2023; Graef and Ouss, 2026)? More broadly, the paper suggests that prosecutor-office organization is itself a consequential policy margin. If lower-severity cases can be screened out earlier without evident public-safety losses, then the design of intake may be a first-order determinant of who is punished, how much punishment they receive, and the system cost for those outcomes.

WORKING PAPER

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WORKING PAPER

A Appendix: Robustness

A.1 Main-Outcome Robustness

This appendix reports robustness checks for the main early-outcome and time-to-disposition results. The exercises below vary the outcome window, compare first-time and repeat defendants, and report placebo estimates in a pre-period, estimate treatment-on-treated effects using two-stage least squares, and compare functional forms. These checks support the interpretation that the main findings are stable across reasonable alternative specifications and samples.

Table 5: Criminal-history split: no prior convictions vs. prior convictions

	Non-prosecution		Non-plea dismissal		Remand	
	No priors	Prior convictions	No priors	Prior convictions	No priors	Prior convictions
Assigned to screening (pp)	7.77***	5.39***	5.25***	3.27***	2.52***	2.12***
	(0.80)	(0.64)	(0.69)	(0.52)	(0.43)	(0.39)
Observations	3,413	3,536	3,413	3,536	3,413	3,536
Fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: OLS ITT estimates with defendant-clustered standard errors. Arrestees in the no-priors columns have no prior convictions; arrestees in the prior-convictions columns have at least one prior conviction. All specifications include full fixed effects and controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 6: Pre-period placebo test

	Non-prosecution ≤60 days	Non-plea dismissal ≤60 days	Remand ≤60 days
Fake treatment (pp)	0.14	0.04	0.10
	(0.65)	(0.58)	(0.30)
Observations	3,537	3,537	3,537
Fixed effects	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Placebo test using pre-RCT period (Nov 2022 to Apr 2023). 'Fake treatment' is assigned using the exact same digit-based randomization as the actual RCT (even last defendant ID digits: [0, 2, 4, 6, 8]), but applied to a period before the intervention began (should have no effect). Estimates close to zero and statistically insignificant provide evidence that the randomization procedure was not correlated with outcomes in the pre-period, validating the randomization mechanism. All specifications include agency, quarter, and day-of-week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by defendant. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

WORKING PAPER

Table 7: Treatment-on-treated (2SLS) vs. ITT for 60-day outcomes

	Non-prosecution		Non-plea dismissal		Remand	
	ITT	2SLS	ITT	2SLS	ITT	2SLS
Treatment effect (pp)	6.57***	7.29***	4.25***	4.72***	2.32***	2.57***
	(0.51)	(0.61)	(0.43)	(0.50)	(0.29)	(0.35)
Treatment-arm screening take-up (%)			97.9%			
First-stage F-stat	–	29394.73	–	29394.73	–	29394.73
Observations	6,949	6,949	6,949	6,949	6,949	6,949
Fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: ITT estimates show the effect of being assigned to screening (intent-to-treat). 2SLS estimates instrument actual screening with randomized assignment in the same fixed-effects and controls specification. The first-stage F-stat row reports the excluded-instrument test from the matched first-stage model for each 2SLS column. Treatment-arm screening take-up among assigned cases is 97.9%. All specifications include full fixed effects and controls. Standard errors clustered by defendant. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table 8: Functional-form robustness for 60-day outcomes

	LPM (min)	LPM (full)	Logit (AME)	Probit (AME)
Non-prosecution				
Assigned to screening (pp)	6.75***	6.57***	6.75***	6.75***
	(0.53)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)
Non-plea dismissal				
Assigned to screening (pp)	4.36***	4.25***	4.36***	4.36***
	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)
Remand				
Assigned to screening (pp)	2.39***	2.32***	2.39***	2.39***
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Observations	6,949	6,949	6,949	6,949
Fixed effects		✓		
Controls		✓		

Notes: Comparison of linear probability model (LPM/OLS), logit, and probit specifications. For logit and probit, we report average marginal effects (AME) to make coefficients comparable to LPM. "LPM (min)" includes treatment only; "LPM (full)" adds fixed effects (agency, quarter, day-of-week) and controls. Logit/probit include treatment only; adding controls/FE causes non-convergence due to perfect/quasi-separation. Minimal specifications (LPM, logit, probit) are directly comparable. Similar estimates validate functional form. For LPM, standard errors are clustered by defendant; for logit/probit, robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

WORKING PAPER

A.2 Global Case Robustness

Although our main analysis treats each administrative case as a separate observation, a global plea agreement can resolve multiple cases involving the same defendant. A defendant may plead guilty to a charge in one case in exchange for dismissal of every charge in another case. The latter case is recorded as resolved via a plea dismissal even though it contains no guilty-plea charge. Case-level counts of guilty pleas and plea dismissals therefore need not correspond to the number of distinct plea agreements. To assess sensitivity to the unit of analysis, we also aggregate administrative cases involving the same defendant into "global" cases. The global case grouping rule combines all cases disposed for a single defendant within 5 days of one another[8]. When calculating global cases, some cases could be RCT-ineligible. To reduce ambiguous interpretation, we exclude these for the calculations below. For the primary robustness samples, aggregation to the global case level does not substantively change our conclusions. Tables 9 and 10 report the early-outcome and time-to-disposition results, respectively, and Table 11 reports the disposition mix.

Table 9: Global-Case Aggregation Robustness: 60-Day ITT Effects

Outcome	Specification	Single case: matched groups	Single case: standard	Global case: matched groups
Non-prosecution	Treatment only	+12.57 [+10.61, +14.53]; 3,151 / 3,010	+6.75 [+5.70, +7.80]; 6,949 / 5,231	+12.69 [+10.73, +14.65]; 3,111 / 3,010
Non-prosecution	Treatment + fixed effects	+12.60 [+10.64, +14.55]; 3,151 / 3,010	+6.80 [+5.75, +7.85]; 6,949 / 5,231	+12.68 [+10.72, +14.64]; 3,111 / 3,010
Non-prosecution	Treatment + fixed effects + controls	+11.41 [+9.59, +13.23]; 3,151 / 3,010	+6.57 [+5.57, +7.57]; 6,949 / 5,231	+11.46 [+9.63, +13.29]; 3,111 / 3,010
Dismissed non-plea	Treatment only	+8.11 [+6.43, +9.79]; 3,151 / 3,010	+4.36 [+3.49, +5.23]; 6,949 / 5,231	+8.28 [+6.58, +9.97]; 3,111 / 3,010
Dismissed non-plea	Treatment + fixed effects	+8.12 [+6.45, +9.80]; 3,151 / 3,010	+4.39 [+3.52, +5.26]; 6,949 / 5,231	+8.26 [+6.56, +9.95]; 3,111 / 3,010
Dismissed non-plea	Treatment + fixed effects + controls	+7.45 [+5.87, +9.04]; 3,151 / 3,010	+4.25 [+3.42, +5.09]; 6,949 / 5,231	+7.53 [+5.93, +9.13]; 3,111 / 3,010
Remand	Treatment only	+4.46 [+3.34, +5.58]; 3,151 / 3,010	+2.39 [+1.80, +2.98]; 6,949 / 5,231	+4.41 [+3.32, +5.51]; 3,111 / 3,010
Remand	Treatment + fixed effects	+4.47 [+3.35, +5.59]; 3,151 / 3,010	+2.41 [+1.82, +3.00]; 6,949 / 5,231	+4.43 [+3.33, +5.52]; 3,111 / 3,010
Remand	Treatment + fixed effects + controls	+3.96 [+2.94, +4.97]; 3,151 / 3,010	+2.32 [+1.75, +2.89]; 6,949 / 5,231	+3.93 [+2.92, +4.94]; 3,111 / 3,010
Disposition	Treatment only	+13.03 [+10.82, +15.24]; 3,151 / 3,010	+7.22 [+5.93, +8.51]; 6,949 / 5,231	+13.12 [+10.93, +15.31]; 3,111 / 3,010
Disposition	Treatment + fixed effects	+13.08 [+10.88, +15.28]; 3,151 / 3,010	+7.26 [+5.98, +8.55]; 6,949 / 5,231	+13.13 [+10.94, +15.32]; 3,111 / 3,010
Disposition	Treatment + fixed effects + controls	+11.79 [+9.71, +13.88]; 3,151 / 3,010	+7.03 [+5.78, +8.27]; 6,949 / 5,231	+11.86 [+9.78, +13.93]; 3,111 / 3,010

Cells report percentage-point estimates and 95% DefendantId-clustered confidence intervals, followed by analysis units / defendant clusters. Non-prosecution is non-plea dismissal or remand. Matched single-case and global-case columns use the same retained groups; separate confidence intervals are reported, with no equality test.

[8] As previously applied here: https://charleston-disparity-in-prosecution.org/

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Table 10: Global-Case Time to Disposition at Prespecified Horizons

Days since earliest eligible arrest	Control disposition (%)	Treatment disposition (%)	Treatment - control (pp)	95% CI lower (pp)	95% CI upper (pp)
30	1.7	10.9	9.2	7.6	10.6
60	4.4	15.9	11.5	9.7	13.4
90	9.7	20.0	10.4	8.3	12.8
180	24.5	31.9	7.4	4.6	10.4
365	51.1	54.2	3.1	-0.2	6.3
730	79.4	79.8	0.4	-2.2	3.0

Cumulative disposition probabilities use all assigned global cases; open cases are right-censored at the extract cutoff. Differences are Treatment minus Control with DefendantId-cluster bootstrap 95% confidence intervals (500 resamples; seed 42).

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Table 11: Global-Case Disposition Mix by Assignment

Disposition	Control probability (%)	Treatment probability (%)	Treatment - control (pp)	Control share among disposed (%)	Treatment share among disposed (%)	Treatment - control among disposed (pp)
Dismissed non-plea	23.3	29.0	5.7	26.9	33.3	6.4
Dismissed plea	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Diverted	8.5	7.8	-0.7	9.8	8.9	-0.9
Guilty plea	50.8	43.0	-7.9	58.7	49.3	-9.4
Guilty trial	0.2	0.1	-0.1	0.2	0.1	-0.1
Other terminal	3.1	2.6	-0.5	3.6	3.0	-0.6
Remanded	0.7	4.7	4.1	0.8	5.4	4.7

Primary probabilities use all eligible assigned global cases (Control N=1,829; Treatment N=1,861). Secondary shares condition on a disposition observed by the extract cutoff (Control N=1,584; Treatment N=1,622).

A.3 Randomization Inference

This appendix reports design-based randomization-inference checks. Because assignment was randomized by defendant identifier, permutation tests provide a finite-sample robustness check that does not rely on large-sample normal approximations. For each permutation, treatment assignments are redrawn in a way consistent with the assignment rule, the relevant statistic is re-estimated, and the observed statistic is compared with the resulting randomization distribution.

For the three 60-day outcomes, the observed effects are far outside the permutation distributions across all specifications. For non-prosecution within 60 days, the observed ITT effect of 6.75 pp (no controls), 6.80 pp (fixed effects only), and 6.57 pp (fixed effects plus controls) each yield permutation p-values of 0.000, 0.000, and 0.011 respectively. Results are similar for non-plea dismissal within 60 days, where the observed effects of 4.36 pp, 4.39 pp, and 4.25 pp yield permutation p-values of 0.000, 0.000, and 0.011, and for remand within 60 days, where observed effects of 2.39 pp, 2.41 pp, and 2.32 pp all yield permutation p-values of 0.000. Figure 6 plots the full permutation distributions against the observed effects for each outcome and specification, confirming that the observed statistics are extreme relative to their randomization distributions.




Figure 6: Randomization inference for 60-day outcomes. Each row represents a different outcome and each column represents a different set of controls.

For time-to-disposition, randomization inference on restricted mean survival time differences confirms the main findings at shorter horizons. The observed RMST difference of 9.32 days at 180 days yields a permutation p-value of 0.000, and the 365-day RMST difference of 14.13 days yields a permutation p-value of 0.000. At the 730-day horizon the observed RMST difference of 17.91 days yields a permutation p-value of 0.022, consistent with the widening

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confidence intervals at longer follow-up visible in Figure 1. Figure 7 plots the permutation distributions for all three horizons.

For guilty plea, randomization inference on the Aalen-Johansen CIF differences confirms that plea reductions are not detectable at short horizons but become robust at longer follow-up. The observed CIF difference of 0.010 at 180 days is not distinguishable from its permutation distribution ($p = 0.300$), while the differences of 0.044 at 365 days and 0.055 at 730 days each yield permutation p-values of 0.001, confirming that the plea reduction is a durable feature of the data rather than an artifact of early case composition.




Figure 7: Randomization inference for survival summaries at three time horizons

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A.4 Additional Heterogeneity and Implementation Checks

This appendix supplements the heterogeneity analysis in Section 4.2. The main text reports the subgroup patterns most relevant for interpreting the pooled treatment effects. Here, we provide the full set of subgroup-specific ITT estimates for 60-day outcomes, the corresponding FDR-adjusted interaction tests, and two additional exploratory checks. These analyses are intended to show where the screening intervention appears more or less effective within the experimental sample; they are not separate pre-registered tests of mechanism.

The estimates in Figure 8 and Table 12 are subgroup-specific treatment effects from the full-sample interaction models described in Section 4.2, including Black and White male defendant sub-groups. The FDR-adjusted values test whether a subgroup effect differs from the reference category within the same heterogeneity family; they do not test whether each subgroup-specific effect differs from zero. The results should therefore be read as descriptive evidence on variation in treatment effects, not as definitive evidence that any one characteristic causally moderates the intervention.


A.4.1 Case administrability and linked-case structure

The first exploratory check focuses on case features that may make early screening easier or harder to implement. These include whether a case involves multiple defendants, whether the defendant has pending matters, and whether the defendant appears repeatedly in the experimental sample. These features are not randomly assigned, but they help describe when an intake-screening workflow is administratively straightforward and when screening decisions are more entangled with other cases or defendants (Table 13).

A.4.2 Implementation phase

The second exploratory check asks whether treatment effects changed over the course of implementation. If effects were driven mainly by start-up enthusiasm, learning, or adaptation by other courtroom actors, we might expect effects to differ between earlier and later periods of the experiment. We therefore split the sample by implementation timing and compare treatment effects across periods (Table 14). These estimates are exploratory because implementation timing is not itself randomly assigned and because longer-run adaptation may require more time than the study period allows.

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Figure 8: Subgroup-specific ITT effects on 60-day outcomes, by heterogeneity family

Table 12: Subgroup-specific ITT effects and FDR-adjusted interaction tests

Family	Subgroup	Outcome	Effect (pp)	95% CI	Interaction q-value
Race / Ethnicity	White (ref.)	Non-prosecution	7.12	[5.29, 8.94]	–
Race / Ethnicity	White (ref.)	Non-plea dismissal	5.81	[4.17, 7.45]	–
Race / Ethnicity	White (ref.)	Remand	1.31	[0.46, 2.16]	–
Race / Ethnicity	Black	Non-prosecution	6.29	[5.10, 7.47]	0.484
Race / Ethnicity	Black	Non-plea dismissal	3.45	[2.50, 4.40]	0.055
Race / Ethnicity	Black	Remand	2.84	[2.10, 3.58]	0.028
Co-defendant Structure	Single defendant (ref.)	Non-prosecution	7.06	[6.01, 8.12]	–
Co-defendant Structure	Single defendant (ref.)	Non-plea dismissal	4.53	[3.66, 5.41]	–
Co-defendant Structure	Single defendant (ref.)	Remand	2.53	[1.93, 3.14]	–
Co-defendant Structure	Multiple defendants	Non-prosecution	3.05	[0.06, 6.03]	0.028
Co-defendant Structure	Multiple defendants	Non-plea dismissal	2.27	[-0.42, 4.96]	0.283
Co-defendant Structure	Multiple defendants	Remand	0.78	[-0.68, 2.24]	0.052
Charge Class	Misdemeanor (ref.)	Non-prosecution	9.14	[7.16, 11.12]	–
Charge Class	Misdemeanor (ref.)	Non-plea dismissal	6.97	[5.18, 8.77]	–
Charge Class	Misdemeanor (ref.)	Remand	2.17	[1.20, 3.14]	–
Charge Class	Felony	Non-prosecution	5.13	[4.04, 6.22]	0.003
Charge Class	Felony	Non-plea dismissal	2.73	[1.90, 3.56]	0.000
Charge Class	Felony	Remand	2.40	[1.68, 3.12]	0.714
Criminal History	No priors (ref.)	Non-prosecution	7.81	[6.22, 9.40]	–
Criminal History	No priors (ref.)	Non-plea dismissal	5.31	[3.94, 6.69]	–
Criminal History	No priors (ref.)	Remand	2.50	[1.64, 3.36]	–
Criminal History	Priors 1	Non-prosecution	9.00	[5.91, 12.09]	0.505
Criminal History	Priors 1	Non-plea dismissal	4.51	[2.26, 6.77]	0.717
Criminal History	Priors 1	Remand	4.49	[2.21, 6.77]	0.153
Criminal History	Priors 2	Non-prosecution	5.11	[2.23, 7.99]	0.143
Criminal History	Priors 2	Non-plea dismissal	4.10	[1.60, 6.60]	0.614
Criminal History	Priors 2	Remand	1.02	[-0.56, 2.60]	0.153
Criminal History	Priors 3	Non-prosecution	1.63	[-1.41, 4.67]	0.003
Criminal History	Priors 3	Non-plea dismissal	0.17	[-2.54, 2.88]	0.005
Criminal History	Priors 3	Remand	1.46	[0.10, 2.82]	0.243
Criminal History	Priors 4	Non-prosecution	3.20	[0.16, 6.24]	0.022
Criminal History	Priors 4	Non-plea dismissal	1.74	[-0.57, 4.06]	0.043
Criminal History	Priors 4	Remand	1.45	[-0.10, 3.01]	0.281
Criminal History	Priors 56	Non-prosecution	5.08	[1.70, 8.46]	0.172
Criminal History	Priors 56	Non-plea dismissal	3.92	[1.03, 6.82]	0.614
Criminal History	Priors 56	Remand	1.16	[-0.34, 2.65]	0.168
Criminal History	Priors 7 Or More	Non-prosecution	5.25	[2.73, 7.77]	0.130
Criminal History	Priors 7 Or More	Non-plea dismissal	3.35	[1.27, 5.43]	0.283
Criminal History	Priors 7 Or More	Remand	1.90	[0.44, 3.35]	0.518
Gender	Male (ref.)	Non-prosecution	5.79	[4.72, 6.86]	–
Gender	Male (ref.)	Non-plea dismissal	3.83	[2.92, 4.75]	–
Gender	Male (ref.)	Remand	1.96	[1.39, 2.52]	–
Gender	Female	Non-prosecution	10.08	[7.38, 12.78]	0.018
Gender	Female	Non-plea dismissal	6.15	[4.02, 8.27]	0.153
Gender	Female	Remand	3.93	[2.11, 5.75]	0.070
Pending Prior Arrest	No pending prior arrest (ref.)	Non-prosecution	8.11	[6.79, 9.44]	–
Pending Prior Arrest	No pending prior arrest (ref.)	Non-plea dismissal	5.40	[4.27, 6.53]	–
Pending Prior Arrest	No pending prior arrest (ref.)	Remand	2.71	[1.97, 3.45]	–
Pending Prior Arrest	Pending prior arrest	Non-prosecution	3.28	[2.01, 4.56]	0.000
Pending Prior Arrest	Pending prior arrest	Non-plea dismissal	1.81	[0.82, 2.80]	0.000
Pending Prior Arrest	Pending prior arrest	Remand	1.47	[0.64, 2.30]	0.052
Gun / Weapon Case	Non-gun case (ref.)	Non-prosecution	7.05	[5.96, 8.15]	–
Gun / Weapon Case	Non-gun case (ref.)	Non-plea dismissal	4.35	[3.46, 5.24]	–
Gun / Weapon Case	Non-gun case (ref.)	Remand	2.70	[2.04, 3.37]	–
Gun / Weapon Case	Gun / weapon case	Non-prosecution	3.55	[0.98, 6.11]	0.029
Gun / Weapon Case	Gun / weapon case	Non-plea dismissal	3.65	[1.12, 6.18]	0.717
Gun / Weapon Case	Gun / weapon case	Remand	-0.10	[-0.35, 0.15]	0.000

Notes: Main-text table shows the paper-discussed subgroup families. Reported effects are subgroup-specific ITT effects from the full-sample interaction models. Q-values apply only to the interaction contrasts; omitted-category rows therefore have no q-value.

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Table 13: Appendix-only exploratory hypothesis H3: ownership and handoff proxies

Proxy	Subset	Outcome	Estimator	Effect	95% CI	Contrast p-value
Multi-defendant case	Single-defendant	60-day non-prosecution	LPM interaction	7.1 pp	[6.0, 8.1] pp	
Multi-defendant case	Multi-defendant	60-day non-prosecution	LPM interaction	3.0 pp	[0.1, 6.0] pp	0.013
Multi-defendant case	Single-defendant	60-day dismissal	LPM interaction	4.5 pp	[3.7, 5.4] pp	
Multi-defendant case	Multi-defendant	60-day dismissal	LPM interaction	2.3 pp	[-0.4, 5.0] pp	0.116
Multi-defendant case	Single-defendant	60-day remand	LPM interaction	2.5 pp	[1.9, 3.1] pp	
Multi-defendant case	Multi-defendant	60-day remand	LPM interaction	0.8 pp	[-0.7, 2.2] pp	0.028
Multi-defendant case	Single-defendant	Plea CIF at 365 days	AJ subgroup contrast	3.3 pp	[0.5, 6.1] pp	
Multi-defendant case	Multi-defendant	Plea CIF at 365 days	AJ subgroup contrast	1.5 pp	[-4.2, 7.6] pp	
Pending prior arrest	No pending prior arrest	60-day non-prosecution	LPM interaction	8.1 pp	[6.8, 9.4] pp	
Pending prior arrest	Pending prior arrest	60-day non-prosecution	LPM interaction	3.3 pp	[2.0, 4.6] pp	0.000
Pending prior arrest	No pending prior arrest	60-day dismissal	LPM interaction	5.4 pp	[4.3, 6.5] pp	
Pending prior arrest	Pending prior arrest	60-day dismissal	LPM interaction	1.8 pp	[0.8, 2.8] pp	0.000
Pending prior arrest	No pending prior arrest	60-day remand	LPM interaction	2.7 pp	[2.0, 3.5] pp	
Pending prior arrest	Pending prior arrest	60-day remand	LPM interaction	1.5 pp	[0.6, 2.3] pp	0.029
Pending prior arrest	No pending prior arrest	Plea CIF at 365 days	AJ subgroup contrast	2.0 pp	[-0.4, 4.7] pp	
Pending prior arrest	Pending prior arrest	Plea CIF at 365 days	AJ subgroup contrast	5.0 pp	[1.3, 10.0] pp	
Repeated-defendant proxy	Single-case defendant	60-day non-prosecution	LPM interaction	8.3 pp	[6.9, 9.7] pp	
Repeated-defendant proxy	Repeated defendant	60-day non-prosecution	LPM interaction	3.9 pp	[2.5, 5.2] pp	0.000
Repeated-defendant proxy	Single-case defendant	60-day dismissal	LPM interaction	5.7 pp	[4.5, 6.9] pp	
Repeated-defendant proxy	Repeated defendant	60-day dismissal	LPM interaction	2.0 pp	[1.0, 3.1] pp	0.000
Repeated-defendant proxy	Single-case defendant	60-day remand	LPM interaction	2.6 pp	[1.8, 3.4] pp	
Repeated-defendant proxy	Repeated defendant	60-day remand	LPM interaction	1.8 pp	[1.0, 2.7] pp	0.183
Repeated-defendant proxy	Single-case defendant	Plea CIF at 365 days	AJ subgroup contrast	2.2 pp	[-0.6, 4.8] pp	
Repeated-defendant proxy	Repeated defendant	Plea CIF at 365 days	AJ subgroup contrast	4.4 pp	[0.7, 9.1] pp	

Notes: This appendix-only table is exploratory and does not alter the paper's core estimands. Binary outcome rows are treatment-minus-control percentage-point effects from clustered linear probability interaction models. The plea row reports the control-minus-treatment AJ subgroup contrast at 365 days, so positive values indicate fewer guilty pleas under screening. Pending prior arrest is 1 for prior-only and prior-and-subsequent pendency categories; subsequent-only status is 0. linked-case fragmentation is proxied with a repeated-defendant indicator because the shared analysis data do not expose an explicit linked-case or handoff flag.

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Table 14: Appendix-only exploratory hypothesis H5: adaptation over time

Subset	Outcome	Estimator	Effect	95% CI	Contrast p-value
Early period	60-day non-prosecution	LPM interaction	8.1 pp	[6.5, 9.7] pp	
Late period	60-day non-prosecution	LPM interaction	5.2 pp	[4.0, 6.5] pp	0.006
Early period	RMST at 365 days	RMST subgroup contrast	11.4 days	[0.1, 21.1] days	
Late period	RMST at 365 days	RMST subgroup contrast	16.5 days	[7.9, 25.5] days	
Early period	Plea CIF at 365 days	AJ subgroup contrast	4.9 pp	[1.0, 8.4] pp	
Late period	Plea CIF at 365 days	AJ subgroup contrast	1.5 pp	[-1.7, 4.4] pp	

Notes: This appendix-only table is exploratory and does not alter the paper's core estimands. Early and late periods split the eligible sample at the median arrest-month index. Non-prosecution effects are treatment-minus-control percentage-point effects from clustered linear probability interaction models. RMST and AJ plea CIF rows report control-minus-treatment subgroup contrasts, so positive values indicate faster disposition or fewer guilty pleas under screening. Adaptation timing is defined from arrest-month order within the eligible sample; no direct operational-change timestamp is available beyond case timing itself.

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


Figure 9: Racial differences in non-prosecution dispositions by experimental group


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B Appendix: Plea and Competing Risks

This appendix reports supplementary analyses for the plea results. Because guilty pleas and plea dismissals are only a subset of several mutually exclusive case endpoints, the paper estimates cumulative incidence functions in a competing-risks framework rather than treating remands, diversions, non-plea dismissals, and other terminal outcomes[9] as non-informative censoring. Figure 10 decomposes the competing endpoints by assignment arm and by the disposition categories in the order noted in the Methods (3.4). Note the y-axes were chosen to vary independently to best display the data, they should not be interpreted independent of the main text (e.g., there were only 4 "guilty at trial" cases overall, so should not be interpreted as a real difference between arms). The robustness checks show that the plea result is not driven by multi-defendant incidents or by conditioning on early case survival. Note that at two years each of the highlighted early disposition differences ("Dismissed non-plea" and "Remanded") and late disposition differences ("Guilty plea" and "Dismissed plea") maintain their separation between control and treatment. This supports the claim that there isn't simply a "speeding" of cases, but rather a shift in the disposition mix.

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[9]The "Other terminal" category includes cases sent to diversion which had yet to reach a final resolution (successful or unsuccessful).



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Figure 10: Competing-risk cumulative incidence functions by assignment arm




Figure 11: Plea cumulative incidence for single-defendant cases




Figure 12: Guilty Plea and Plea Dismissal CIFs and Control/Treatment Differences

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Table 15: AJ CIF Difference (Control - Treatment) for Guilty plea at Key Horizons

Horizon (days)	CIF Diff (Control - Treatment)	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper
60	-0.0028	-0.0101	0.0039
180	0.0088	-0.0101	0.0261
365	0.0325	0.0092	0.0553
730	0.0366	0.0131	0.0643

Table 16: AJ CIF Difference (Control - Treatment) for Dismissed plea at Key Horizons

Horizon (days)	CIF Diff (Control - Treatment)	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper
60	-0.0004	-0.0042	0.0027
180	0.0046	-0.0075	0.0151
365	0.0106	-0.0048	0.0251
730	0.0136	-0.0039	0.0314

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C Appendix: Methodology

C.1 Marginal Cases and Effective Populations

This appendix develops the effective-population characterization used to study the marginal cases whose prosecution status is altered by screening. The analysis was not pre-registered and is presented here as suggestive mechanism evidence rather than as a primary causal estimate. Our marginal-case characterization is related in spirit to recent work that uses prosecutor-office administrative data to study screening and declination decisions and to learn about cases moved by heterogeneity in prosecutorial screening propensities (Miller and Wright, 2008; Amaranto et al., 2018; Sloan, 2026). The key difference is that our setting randomizes the organizational workflow itself, rather than relying on cross-prosecutor variation in screening behavior, allowing us to characterize the cases induced into early non-prosecution by assignment to screening.

C.1.1 Framework

To characterize the marginal cases whose prosecution status is altered by screening, we use a principal-stratification framework closely related to the familiar complier logic in the local-average-treatment-effect literature. Let $D_i(z)$ indicate whether case i is non-prosecuted within 60 days—dismissed or remanded—under assignment $z \in \{0, 1\}$. The principal strata are defined by the pair $(D_i(0), D_i(1))$: *always-takers* (cases that would be non-prosecuted early under either workflow), *never-takers* (cases that would not be non-prosecuted early under either workflow), and the *marginal stratum* (also called *compliers* in the LATE literature) consisting of cases that are non-prosecuted within 60 days only if assigned to screening.

C.1.2 Identifying assumptions and estimating moments

Identification of the marginal stratum and its counterfactual outcomes requires two maintained assumptions. First, *monotonicity*: $D_i(1) \geq D_i(0)$, ruling out cases that would be non-prosecuted within 60 days under standard handling but not under screening. We view this as plausible because the intervention added an earlier opportunity for substantive review, though the assumption is not directly testable.

Second, *exclusion*: among cases not induced into early non-prosecution by screening, assignment to the screening workflow does not otherwise change plea outcomes. This restriction could fail if, for example, screener notes or knowledge that a case had cleared screening changed line-prosecutor behavior. We view these channels as limited because notes were brief and optional, and cases that cleared screening were routed into the standard prosecution pipeline without a formal treatment-status indicator.

For transparency, the appendix tables use the following design-based moments. Let M denote the marginal stratum: cases induced into early non-prosecution by assignment to screening. The share of marginal cases is

$$\pi_M = E[D_i \mid Z_i = 1] - E[D_i \mid Z_i = 0].$$

For any pre-treatment characteristic X_i, the marginal-stratum mean is recovered as

WORKING PAPER

$$E[X_i \mid M] = \frac{E[D_i X_i \mid Z_i = 1] - E[D_i X_i \mid Z_i = 0]}{\pi_M}.$$

For a downstream outcome Y_i, the counterfactual outcome that marginal cases would have experienced under standard handling is recovered from the early-prosecuted cases:

$$E[Y_i(0) \mid M] = \frac{E[(1 - D_i)Y_i \mid Z_i = 0] - E[(1 - D_i)Y_i \mid Z_i = 1]}{\pi_M}.$$

The comparison group of cases that remain prosecuted regardless of assignment is observed among treatment cases with $D_i = 0$:

$$E[Y_i \mid \text{never-taker}] = E[Y_i \mid Z_i = 1, D_i = 0].$$

These moments follow the standard LATE and principal-stratification logic, implemented using the effective-population shortcut of Peter Hull (2025). Because the monotonicity and exclusion assumptions are maintained rather than directly testable, we interpret the resulting estimates as exploratory evidence on mechanism rather than as the paper's primary causal estimates.

C.1.3 Marginal-case characteristics

Table 17 compares the marginal stratum to the overall eligible sample on pre-treatment characteristics. Marginal cases are similar to the eligible population on demographics but systematically less severe on case characteristics: lower felony share, fewer charges per case, lower victim-charge incidence, and lower co-defendant counts. This pattern is consistent with the marginal stratum being cases that screening filtered out at intake because they were marginal for prosecution to begin with, rather than cases that random fluctuation pushed across the 60-day cutoff.

Table 18 reports proxies for bargaining position among marginal cases stratified by race. Private representation[10] rates differ between Black and White compliers, suggesting that the marginal stratum's bargaining context is not identical across groups even when within-sample treatment effects are broadly similar. We discuss this pattern in connection with the race-stratified plea findings in Section 4.3.

[10] as recorded at disposition

WORKING PAPER

Table 17: Marginal cases compared to the overall eligible sample

Characteristic	Compliers	Overall Eligible	Difference
Age (years)	37.377	36.590	0.787
Race (Black)	0.649	0.661	-0.012
Gender (Female)	0.277	0.182	0.095
Number of Case Charges	1.057	1.347	-0.290
Crime (Drugs)	0.293	0.295	-0.002
Crime (Dv)	0.037	0.066	-0.030
Crime (Guns)	0.064	0.107	-0.043
Crime (Property)	0.304	0.306	-0.002
Crime (Traffic)	0.122	0.102	0.020
Crime (Other)	0.110	0.082	0.028
Felony Case (at arrest)	0.501	0.642	-0.141
Case Has Gun Charge	0.075	0.140	-0.065
Case Has Drug Charge	0.298	0.319	-0.021
Case Has Victims	0.034	0.361	-0.327
1 Prior Conviction	0.153	0.121	0.033
2 Prior Convictions	0.075	0.094	-0.019
3 Prior Convictions	0.016	0.068	-0.052
4 Prior Convictions	0.029	0.059	-0.030
5-6 Prior Convictions	0.053	0.069	-0.016
7+ Prior Convictions	0.070	0.098	-0.028
Has Pending Prior Arrest	0.150	0.320	-0.170
Codefs	0.058	0.123	-0.065

Notes: The overall eligible sample is the notebook's ITT analysis sample used for the plea analysis.

Compliers are defined by early non-prosecution within 60 days; the comparison is descriptive and intended for appendix context.

WORKING PAPER

Table 18: Bargaining power indicators: compliers by race

Characteristic	Black compliers	White compliers	Difference
Age (years)	36.66	38.48	-1.82
Felony charge	48.0%	48.1%	-0.1%
Gun charge	12.0%	5.7%	6.3%*
Drug charge	28.6%	24.5%	4.0%
Victim-involved case	5.7%	7.5%	-1.8%
Pending prior arrest	13.7%	14.2%	-0.4%
Multi-defendant case	9.1%	13.2%	-4.1%
No prior convictions	59.4%	67.9%	-8.5%
1 prior conviction	16.0%	10.4%	5.6%
2 prior convictions	8.6%	4.7%	3.9%
3 prior convictions	3.4%	1.9%	1.5%
4 prior convictions	3.4%	1.9%	1.5%
5–6 prior convictions	4.6%	4.7%	-0.1%
7+ prior convictions	4.6%	8.5%	-3.9%
Private defense attorney	4.6%	19.8%	-15.2%***
N (compliers)	175	106	

Notes: Compliers are defendants in the treatment (assigned screening) group who experienced non-prosecution within the 60-day analysis window. Rows cover age, charge seriousness, victim involvement, pendency exposure, a multi-defendant-case indicator, repo-standard prior-conviction bins, and private defense. Private defense attorney uses DefenseCounselType == Private when an explicit indicator is absent. Victim-involved case uses the available case_has_victims indicator (any recorded victim on the case). Pending prior arrest is 1 for prior-arrest and prior-and-subsequent categories; subsequent-only and no-other-arrests categories are 0. Multi-defendant case uses the repo-standard codefs indicator when present. Differences test Black vs. White means: $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

WORKING PAPER

C.1.4 Counterfactual plea severity for marginal cases

Beyond characterizing who the marginal cases are, we use the effective-population approach to estimate counterfactual plea outcomes for these cases under standard handling. Specifically, we recover the plea-severity moments that marginal cases would have experienced absent screening and compare them to observed plea outcomes among never-takers (cases that remain prosecuted regardless of assignment). The relevant counterfactual moments are estimated with limited precision because the marginal stratum is a relatively small share of the experimental sample, so we treat the comparisons below as suggestive rather than definitive. Across all five tested outcomes we observe no significant differences between compliers and never-takers (Table 19). Regardless of the lack of differences, the key implication of the plea analysis remains: screening reduces pleas, so marginal cases that would otherwise have generated convictions instead do not.

Table 19: Plea severity: compliers vs. never-takers

Outcome	Compliers E[g(0)—C]	SE	Never-Takers	Difference
Felony to Misdemeanor Rate	0.0603	(0.1066)	0.0931	-0.0328
Statutory Rank Delta	0.7138	(0.7086)	0.5235	0.1903
Hodge Rank Delta	-0.0002	(0.0171)	0.0073	-0.0076
Exposure Score Delta	0.0604	(0.0961)	0.0573	0.0031
Incarceration Score Delta	0.0324	(0.0863)	0.0318	0.0005

Notes: Compliers are cases induced into early non-prosecution within 60 days by screening.
Never-takers are treated cases that remain prosecuted within 60 days ($z = 1, y = 0$).
Difference inference combines uncertainty in both the complier estimate and the never-taker benchmark, with clustered bootstrap comparisons reported in Step 5 when available.
Because the five plea-severity rows are treated as one block of evidence, stars reflect Benjamini-Hochberg FDR-adjusted p-values computed across that family.
$^{***}q < 0.01$, $^{**}q < 0.05$, $^{*}q < 0.1$.

WORKING PAPER

C.2 Pre-Analysis Plan Fidelity and Additional Registered Outcome

This appendix documents how the paper maps to the pre-analysis plan (PAP) registered with the Open Science Framework before outcomes were analyzed (Braman et al., 2023). We summarize the four pre-registered hypotheses, the corresponding analysis in the main text, and the result. We also report the pre-registered disposition-within-60-days outcome, which the main text does not foreground because it overlaps with the time-to-disposition hazard analysis, and we describe deviations from the pre-registered analysis plan.

C.2.1 Pre-registered hypotheses and corresponding results

The pre-analysis plan specified four hypotheses concerning two outcomes (60-day dismissal and time-to-disposition) and two populations (the full eligible sample and the Black-defendant subgroup). Table 20 maps each hypothesis to the corresponding analysis in the main text and reports the outcome.

Table 20: Pre-registered hypotheses and corresponding results

H	Hypothesis (pre-registered)	Paper location	Outcome
4.1	Dismissals within 60 days higher for screened vs. unscreened cases (full sample).	Section 4.1, Table 2, Panel B	Supported
4.2	Time-to-disposition shorter for screened vs. unscreened cases (full sample).	Section 4.1, Figure 1a	Supported
4.3	Dismissals within 60 days higher for screened vs. unscreened Black defendants.	Section 4.2, Figure 2	Supported: positive effect within Black-defendant subgroup
4.4	Time-to-disposition shorter for screened vs. unscreened Black defendants.	Section 4.2, Figures 3a–3b	Supported: shorter time-to-disposition within Black-defendant subgroup

All four pre-registered hypotheses are supported within the experimental sample. The pre-analysis plan hypothesized that screening would increase early dismissals and reduce time-to-disposition overall, and it further expected larger benefits for Black defendants because Black defendants were expected to have lower-quality arrests. The formal race-specific hypotheses tested treatment-control differences among Black defendants, and those hypotheses are supported: screening increases dismissals within 60 days and reduces time-to-disposition for Black defendants. The stronger comparative prediction, however, is not borne out in the experimental sample. Estimated effects are broadly similar for Black and White defendants rather than larger for Black defendants. Section E.2 explains why simi-

WORKING PAPER

lar within-sample treatment effects can nevertheless produce unequal aggregate gains, given Black defendants' disproportionate exposure to the eligible prosecution pipeline.

C.2.2 Deviations from the pre-analysis plan

Several aspects of the analysis deviate from the pre-registered plan. We document them here for transparency.

Composite non-prosecution outcome. The pre-analysis plan specified (non-plea) dismissal within 60 days as a primary outcome. The main text foregrounds a composite *non-prosecution* outcome (non-plea dismissal or remand within 60 days) because the screening intervention's two early-exit pathways are operationally analogous and the composite is a more policy-relevant summary. Component outcomes (non-plea dismissal alone and remand alone) are reported throughout the paper alongside the composite to maintain fidelity to the pre-registered analysis.

Linear probability vs. logistic regression. The pre-analysis plan specified logistic regression for binary 60-day outcomes. The main text estimates linear probability models for ease of interpretation; coefficient estimates from logistic specifications are qualitatively similar.

Inference. The pre-analysis plan specified permutation tests for hypothesis evaluation. The main text uses cluster-robust standard errors and Benjamini-Hochberg false discovery rate control for hypothesis families. We report design-based randomization-inference results in Appendix A.3 as a robustness check; results are consistent with the parametric inference.

Co-defendant assignment rule. The pre-analysis plan specified defendant-level random assignment with persistent group membership. During implementation, an asymmetric co-defendant rule was adopted: when an incident contained co-defendants and any defendant was assigned to screening, all co-defendants on that incident were screened. The rule was an operational adjustment because screeners reviewed cases at the incident level and could not practically separate co-defendants on the same arrest. Our intent-to-treat estimates code each case by its initial defendant-level assignment regardless of these design-induced flips. As a result, treatment exposure on multi-defendant incidents is mechanically higher than the assignment digit alone would imply. Section 2.2 reports the realized adherence rates for both assignment groups.

Plea analysis. The cumulative-plea analysis using competing-risks methods (Section 4.3) was not part of the pre-analysis plan and is best interpreted as exploratory evidence on mechanism. The principal-strata effective-population analysis (Section C.1.1) is similarly exploratory. Both are clearly identified as such in the main text.

Pre-registered exploratory analyses. The pre-analysis plan listed several exploratory analyses (PAP §18) including first-entry vs. recidivation comparisons, spillover analyses, and assessment of law-enforcement behavioral changes. We pursue the first-entry comparison as a robustness check (Appendix A) but do not pursue the spillover or law-enforcement-behavior analyses, which require data outside the scope of the current administrative extract.

WORKING PAPER

C.2.3 Power and realized sample

The pre-analysis plan anticipated approximately 5,740 eligible cases, with minimum-detectable-effect calculations centered on a 4 percent baseline 60-day dismissal rate (PAP Tables 1–2). The realized eligible sample of 7,155 cases over 24 months exceeds that estimate. The realized 60-day non-prosecution effect of 6.57 percentage points (from a 1.50 percent baseline) is substantially larger than the minimum-detectable effect of 1.2 percentage points anticipated for the Black-defendant subgroup at 80 percent power, so the experiment is well-powered for the realized effect. Power for race-stratified time-to-disposition effects is more limited; the pre-analysis plan anticipated this and noted that survival models and mixture-model approaches would be used on truncated data for undisposed cases (PAP Section 11.3).

WORKING PAPER

D Appendix: Experimental Design and Implementation

This appendix provides additional documentation of the screening intervention and the experimental sample. It presents the eligibility rules and written screening guidelines, descriptive comparisons of eligible and ineligible Charleston County cases, and monthly treatment-assignment shares.

D.1 Eligible CDR charge list

The screening intervention applied only to cases in which all charges appeared on the list of eligible CDR codes (provided below) specified by SOL9 before implementation. SOL9 subsequently removed several drug-trafficking charges that the office determined were inappropriate for rapid screening. Cases containing any off-list charge were excluded.

Table 21: Screening-Eligible South Carolina CDR Charge List

CDR Code	Description
0002	ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT TO A FELONY, GENERAL PROVISION (VIOLENT IF VIOLENT FELONY)
0004	ESCAPE / AIDING ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY OF OFFICERS
0010	WEAPONS / ASSAULT WITH CONCEALED WEAPON
0020	FINANTC / CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FORGERY DEVICE
0027	DRUGS / ATTEMPT AND CONSPIRACY, GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE DRUG LAWS (HALF THE PENALTY OF SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE)
0030	BLACKMAIL / BLACKMAIL OR EXTORTION
0041	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FORGERY
0043	WEAPONS / CARRY CONCEALED WEAPON, NOT A PISTOL, E.G. DIRK, METAL KNUCKLES, ETC. (SEE 0044 IF PISTOL)
0044	WEAPONS / UNLAWFUL CARRYING OF PISTOL
0049	CONSPIRACY / CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, COMMON LAW CONSPIRACY DEFINED
0051	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY, WILLFUL INJURY TO COURTHOUSE OR JAIL
0052	WEAPONS / DISCHARGING FIREARMS INTO A DWELLING
0057	TRAFFIC / HABITUAL TRAFFIC OFFENDERS, DUS AS PER HABITUAL TRAFFIC OFFENDER STATUS
0065	TRAFFIC / FAILURE TO STOP FOR A BLUE LIGHT, NO INJURY OR DEATH - 1ST OFFENSE
0074	PRISONERS / CONTRABAND, POSSESSION BY PRISONER, FURNISHING OR ATTEMPT TO FURNISH PRISONER WITH
0079	BURGLARY / BURGLARY (AFTER JUNE 20, 1985) - FIRST DEGREE
0080	BURGLARY / BURGLARY (NON-VIOLENT) - SECOND DEGREE
0086	BURGLARY / BURGLARY (VIOLENT) (AFTER 06/20/85) - SECOND DEGREE

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WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
0088	IMPERSONATING / IMPERSONATING LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
0089	FOOD / UNLAWFUL, MALICIOUS TAMPERING WITH HUMAN DRUG PRODUCT OR FOOD
0091	SEX / INDECENT EXPOSURE
0107	DRUGS / DISTRIBUTE, SELL, MANUF. OR PWID, OF CONT. SUB., NEAR SCHOOL
0111	UTILITIES / MALICIOUS INJURY TO TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH, OR ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM
0115	PUBLIC / PUBLIC OFFICIAL, MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE
0122	WEAPONS / POINTING AND PRESENTING FIREARMS AT A PERSON
0124	TOOLS / POSSESSION, MAKING IMPLEMENTS CAPABLE OF BEING USED IN CRIME
0129	LARCENY / PURSE SNATCHING. NOT GRAND LARCENY, ROBBERY OR PRIVILY STEALING
0130	TRAFFIC / RACING ON A PUBLIC ROAD
0137	ROBBERY / COMMON LAW ROBBERY, STRONG ARM ROBBERY
0150	SWINDLING / SWINDLING
0171	HOUSEBREAKING / ENTERING OR ATTEMPT TO ENTER HOUSE OR VESSEL WITHOUT BREAKING WITH INTENT TO STEAL
0174	DUS / DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, LICENSE NOT SUSPENDED FOR DUI - 2ND OFFENSE
0175	DUS / DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, LICENSE NOT SUSPENDED FOR DUI - 3RD OR SUB. OFFENSE
0176	DRUGS / POSS. OF NARC. IN SCHEDULE I(B),(C), LSD & SCHEDULE II - 1ST OFFENSE
0177	DRUGS / POSS. OF NARC. IN SCHEDULE I(B),(C), LSD & SCHEDULE II - 2ND OFFENSE
0178	DRUGS / POSS. OF NARC. IN SCHEDULE I(B),(C), LSD & SCHEDULE II - 3RD OR SUB. OFFENSE
0179	DRUGS / POSS. OF OTHER CONTROLLED SUB. IN SCHED. I TO V - 1ST OFFENSE
0180	DRUGS / POSS. OF OTHER CONTROLLED SUB. IN SCHED. I TO V - 2ND OR SUB. OFFENSE
0182	DRUGS / POSS. OF 28G (1 OZ) OR LESS OF MARIJUANA OR 10G - 2ND OR SUB. OFFENSE
0183	DRUGS / MDP, NARCOTIC DRUGS IN SCH. I(B) & (C), LSD, AND SCHED. II
0184	DRUGS / MDP, NARCOTIC DRUGS IN SCH. I(B) & (C), LSD, AND SCHED. II - 2ND OFFENSE
0185	DRUGS / MDP, NARCOTIC DRUGS IN SCH. I(B) & (C), LSD, AND SCHED. II - 3RD OR SUB. OFFENSE
0186	DRUGS / MANUF., POSS. OF OTHER SUB. IN SCH. I, II, III OR FLUNITRAZEPAM OR ANALOGUE, W.I.T.D. - 1ST OFFENSE
0187	DRUGS / MANUF., POSS. OF OTHER SUB. IN SCH. I, II, III OR FLUNITRAZEPAM OR ANALOGUE, W.I.T.D. - 2ND OFFENSE

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WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
0188	DRUGS / MANUF., POSS. OF OTHER SUB. IN SCH. I, II, III OR FLUNITRAZEPAM, W.I.T.D. - 3RD OR SUB. OFFENSE
0189	DRUGS / MANUF., POSS. OF SCH. IV DRUGS, EXCEPT FLUNITRAZEPAM, WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE - 1ST OFFENSE
0190	DRUGS / MANUF., POSS. OF SCH. IV, EXCEPT FLUNITRAZEPAM DRUGS WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE - 2ND OR SUB. OFFENSE
0191	DRUGS / MANUFACTURE, POSSESSION OF SCHEDULE V DRUGS WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE - 1ST OFFENSE
0192	DRUGS / MANUF., POSSESSION OF SCHEDULE V DRUGS WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE - 2ND OR SUB. OFFENSE
0222	VEHICLE / USE OF VEHICLE WITHOUT PERMISSION FOR TEMP. PURPOSE ONLY, UNCONNECTED TO OTHER CRIME
0243	ALCOHOL / UNLAWFUL SALE, MANUFACTURE ETC. OF ALCOHOLIC LIQUORS - 1ST OFFENSE
0244	ALCOHOL / UNLAWFUL SALE, MANUFACTURE ETC. OF ALCOHOLIC LIQUORS - 2ND OFFENSE
0249	ALCOHOL / UNLAWFUL STORAGE OR TRANSPORTATION OF ALCOHOLIC LIQUORS - 1ST OFFENSE
0256	RESISTING / ASSAULT, BEAT, OR WOUND POLICE OFFICER SERVING PROCESS OR WHILE RESISTING ARREST
0258	LARCENY / BREAKING INTO MOTOR VEHICLE OR TANKS, PUMPS, WHERE FUEL, LUBRICANTS STORED
0262	BRIBES / GIVING OR OFFERING BRIBES TO OFFICERS
0273	FRAUD / DEFRAUDING HOTEL, INN, BOARDING HOUSE OR RESTAURANT
0278	DRUGS / TRAFFICKING IN COCAINE, 10G OR MORE, BUT LESS THAN 28G, 1ST OFFENSE
0287	DRUGS / TRAFFICKING IN HEROIN, MORPH., ETC., 14 G OR MORE, BUT LESS THAN 28 G
0293	DRUGS / DIST. I(B),(C), LSD AND II NARCOTIC DRUGS AND CRACK COCAINE TO PERSON UNDER 18 BY PERSON 18 OR OVER
0296	DRUGS / OBTAINING PREP. OF DRUGS, OR CERTAIN DRUGS BY FRAUD, DECEIT, OR THE LIKE - 1ST OFFENSE
0300	WEAPONS / CARRYING OR DISPLAYING FIREARMS IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS OR ADJACENT AREAS
0309	ALARM / INTERFERENCE WITH FIRE AND POLICE ALARM BOXES, GIVING FALSE ALARMS
0314	WEAPONS / UNLAWFUL TRANSPORTATION OF MACHINE GUN OR SAWED-OFF SHOTGUN OR RIFLE
0315	WEAPONS / UNLAW. STORE, KEEP., POSS. MACHINE GUN OR SAWED-OFF SHOTGUN OR RIFLE
0316	WEAPONS / UNLAW. SELL., RENT., GIVE AWAY MACHINE GUN, SAWED-OFF SHOTGUN OR RIFLE
0317	MASKS / WEARING MASKS AND THE LIKE

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WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
0326	RESISTING / RESISTING ARREST; OPPOSE OR RESIST LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER SERVING PROCESS OR MAKING ARREST
0332	LARCENY / STEALING DOGS
0340	TRESPASSING / ENTRY ON ANOTHER'S LAND FOR VARIOUS PURPOSES WITHOUT PERMISSION - 3RD OR SUB. OFFENSE
0346	WEAPONS / MANUFACTURE OR POSS. OF ARTICLE DESIGNED TO CAUSE DAMAGE BY FIRE (FIREBOMBS)
0348	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD THEFT
0371	RSG / CHOP SHOP, UNLAWFULLY OWN, OPERATE, CONDUCT, OR TO TRANSPORT OR SELL VEHICLE TO
0377	OBSCENE / EXPOSURE OF PRIVATE PARTS IN A LEWD AND LASCIVIOUS MANNER
0392	DRUGS / TRAFFICKING IN METH. OR COCAINE BASE - 28 G OR MORE, BUT LESS THAN 100 G - 1ST OFFENSE
0409	PUBLIC / PUBLIC OFFICIAL, BRIBES, INFLUENCE ACTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE, MEMBER, OFFICIAL OR WITNESS
0427	BURGLARY / BURGLARY (AFTER JUNE 20, 1985) - THIRD DEGREE - 1ST OFFENSE
0429	GRAVES / OBLITERATION, VANDALIZATION OR DESECRATION OF HUMAN BURIAL GROUNDS
0437	PRISONERS / CONTRABAND, FURNISH. OR POSS., COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL PRISONS PROHIBITED
0439	PRISONERS / INCITE PRISONERS TO RIOT
0441	PRISONERS / CARRYING OR CONCEALING WEAPON BY INMATES
0446	CHECKS / FRAUDULENT CHECK, OR STOP PAYMENT, >$1000.00 - 2ND OR SUB.
0450	DRUGS / TRAFFICKING IN METH. OR COCAINE BASE - 10 G OR MORE, BUT LESS THAN 28 G - 1ST OFFENSE
0471	GRAVES / DESTRUCTION, DESECRATION OR REMOVAL OF HUMAN REMAINS
0484	AIRPORT / UNLAWFUL ENTRY OF AIRCRAFT, DAMAGING OR REMOVING EQUIPMENT
0488	FORGERY / FORGERY, NO DOLLAR AMOUNT INVOLVED
0518	RECORDINGS / ILLEGAL DISTRIBUTION OF RECORDINGS (1000 OR MORE SOUND ARTICLES, OR 65 OR MORE VISUAL ARTICLES)
0528	SHOPLIFTING / SHOPLIFTING, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS
0529	SHOPLIFTING / SHOPLIFTING, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000
0530	SHOPLIFTING / SHOPLIFTING, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
0535	VEHICLE / ALTERING, FORGING, OR COUNTERFEITING CERT. OF TITLE, REG. CARD, OR LICENSE PLATE
0536	VEHICLE / REMOVE, FALSIFYING VIN INTENDING TO CONCEAL IDENTITY
0537	VEHICLE / RECEIVING OR SELLING VEHICLE WITH FALSIFIED VIN NUMBER

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WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
0539	WEAPONS / AMMUNITION, USE, MAN., POSS., PURCHASE, OR SALE OF TEFLON COATED AMMUNITION
0541	THREAT / THREATENING LIFE, PERSON OR FAMILY OF PUBLIC OFFICIAL, TEACHER, PRINCIPAL
0545	PRISONERS / TRESPASS OR LOITERING ON OR REFUSAL TO LEAVE STATE CORRECTIONAL PROPERTIES
0549	WEAPONS / POSS. WEAPON DURING VIOLENT CRIME, IF NOT ALSO SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE OR DEATH
0552	WEAPONS / ARTICLES REGULATING USE, POSSESSION OF MACHINE GUNS, SAWN OFF SHOTGUNS, RIFLES
0561	DRUGS / VIOL. DRUG DISTRIBUTION LAW, NONCONTROLLED, IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, PROHIBITED ACTS C
0562	DRUGS / UNLAWFUL PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, BLANK PRESCRIPTION - 1ST OFFENSE
0571	RAILROAD / INTERFERENCE WITH TRAFFIC-CONTROL DEVICES OR RR SIGNS OR SIGNALS, NO INJURY
0572	RSG / CHOP SHOP, BUY, DISP. SELL, ETC. VEHICLE OR PART WITH TAMPERED ID. NUMBER
0573	RSG / CHOP SHOP, ALTER, DEFACE, DESTROY, DISGUISE, ETC. A VEHICLE ID. NUMBER
0574	RSG / CHOP SHOP, ATTEMPTED VIOLATION CHOP SHOP, STOLEN, AND ALTERED PROPERTY ACT
0575	RSG / CHOP SHOP, CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE CHOP SHOP, STOLEN, AND ALTERED PROPERTY ACT
0607	ALCOHOL / TRANSPORT ALCOHOL IN MOTOR VEHICLE WITH SEAL BROKEN
0615	WEAPONS / CARRYING WEAPONS ON SCHOOL PROPERTY
0622	DISORDERLY / PUBLIC DISORDERLY CONDUCT
0624	DUS / DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, LICENSE NOT SUSPENDED FOR DUI - 1ST OFFENSE
0632	DRUGS / GLUE SNIFFING, AROMATIC HYDROCARBONS UNLAWFUL
0635	LITTERING / LITTERING EXCEEDING 500 LBS.
0645	VEHICLE / FALSE REPORT OF STOLEN VEHICLE
0652	TRESPASSING / ENTRY ON ANOTHER'S LAND FOR VARIOUS PURPOSES WITHOUT PERMISSION - 1ST OFFENSE
0655	VEHICLE / DAMAGING OR TAMPERING WITH A VEHICLE
0657	TRAFFIC / RECKLESS DRIVING
0659	DRUGS / POSS. OF 28G (1 OZ) OR LESS OF MARIJUANA OR 10G OR LESS OF HASH - 1ST OFFENSE
0660	ALCOHOL / OPEN CONTAINER OF BEER OR WINE IN MOTOR VEHICLE
0670	CHECKS / FRAUDULENT CHECK, OR STOP PAYMENT, $500 OR LESS - 1ST OFFENSE
0690	COIN / USE OF SLUG TO OPERATE MACHINE REQUIRING COIN FOR OPERATION

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WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
0711	RIOT / INSTIGATING, AIDING, OR PARTICIPATING IN RIOT, ANY OTHER SITUATION
0717	KEYS / POSSESSION OF MASTER KEYS AND NONOWNER KEY SETS
0723	RECORDINGS / TRANSFER OF RECORDED SOUNDS, ANY OTHER VIOLATION
0731	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD VALUE $500 OR LESS IN SIX MONTH PERIOD
0732	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD, PRESENTING A RECORD FOR PAYMENT WHEN SALE NOT MADE
0751	RELIGION / DISTURBANCE OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
0754	TATTOOING / TATTOOING
0755	GAMBLING / OPERATING A GAMING HOUSE
0756	VEHICLE / USE OF VEHICLE WITHOUT PERMISSION WITH INTENT TO DEPRIVE
0781	MISPRISION / MISPRISION OF A FELONY (NEGLECT IN REPORTING A CRIME)
0788	ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT OF A FELONY, COMMON LAW UNCLASSIFIED
0795	SOLICITATION / SOLICITATION TO COMMIT A FELONY
0800	CHECKS / FRAUDULENT CHECK, OR STOP PAYMENT, >$1000.00 - 1ST OFFENSE
0804	ALCOHOL / INTERFERENCE WITH OFFICERS & USING ABUSIVE LANGUAGE, ABC AGENTS ENFORCING TITLE 61
0813	INSURANCE / ACTING WITHOUT LICENSE REQUIRED BY TITLE 38 ON INSURANCE
0878	HINDERING / HINDERING AN OFFICER
0891	BREACH / BREACH OF PEACE, NON-AGGRAVATED IN NATURE
0892	DRUGS / PURCHASE OF CONT. SUB. WITHIN PROXIMITY OF SCHOOL
0955	BREACH / BREACH OF PEACE, AGGRAVATED IN NATURE
0956	DUS / DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, LICENSE SUSPENDED FOR DUI - 3RD OR SUB. OFFENSE
0962	RAILROAD / OPENING OR INJURING PACKAGE BY EMPLOYEE OF CARRIER IS UNLAWFUL
1157	PERJURY / PERJURY, FALSE INFORMATION ON A DOCUMENT
1167	TRESPASSING / ENTERING PREMISES AFTER WARNING OR REFUSING TO LEAVE ON REQUEST
1169	TRESPASSING / UNLAWFUL ENTRY INTO ENCLOSED PLACES
1205	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD, LAWFUL OWNER OF CARD EXCEEDING LIMITS
1206	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD, FALSE STATE. ON APPLICATION
1223	REPORT / GIVING FALSE INFORMATION TO LAW ENFORCEMENT, FIRE DEPT. OR RESCUE DEPT.
1228	GAMBLING / UNLAWFUL GAMES AND BETTING

Continued on next page

WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
1237	VEHICLE / REMOVAL OR FALSIFICATION OF VIN NUMBER
1298	TELEPHONE / USE OF 911 NUMBER UNLAWFULLY
1345	BANKING / FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED FINANCIAL INSTITUTION CRIME
1460	NURSE / UNLICENSED PRACTICE AS REGISTERED NURSE OR PRACTICAL NURSE
1483	BROKER / ACTING AS REAL ESTATE BROKER WITHOUT LICENSE
1486	BUILDER / RESIDENTIAL HOME BUILDERS, PRACTICE WITHOUT A LICENSE
1573	DRUGS / HYPODERMIC NEEDLE AND SYRINGE ARTICLE VIOLATION
1575	DRUGS / DISTRIBUTION OF ANABOLIC STEROIDS - 1ST OFFENSE
1577	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF ANABOLIC STEROIDS, 10 OR FEWER DOSES - 1ST OFFENSE
1579	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF ANABOLIC STEROIDS, 11 TO 99 DOSES - 1ST OFFENSE
1638	ANIMALS / CRUEL WORK, ABANDONMENT ETC. OF ANIMALS WHEN NOT TORTURE - 1ST OFFENSE
1640	ANIMALS / ABANDONMENT OF ANIMALS
1651	ANIMALS / POLICE DOG OR HORSE ARTICLE VIOLATION, HARASSING
1706	FIREARMS / HUNTING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED FOR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENT USE OF FIREARMS OR ARCHERY TACKLE
1707	FIREARMS / CRIMINAL NEGLIGENT USE OF FIREARMS OR ARCHERY TACKLE, NO INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE
1709	FIREARMS / CRIM. NEG. USE FIREARMS, ARCHERY TACKLE, PERSONAL INJ. WITH DISFIGUREMENT OR PERM. DISABILITY
1710	FIREARMS / CRIM. NEG. USE FIREARMS, ARCHERY TACKLE, PERSONAL INJ., NO DISFIGUREMENT OR PERM. DISABILITY
2045	AIRPORT / TRESPASSING, PARKING, DRIVING OR DRAG RACING ON AIRPORT PROPERTY
2054	DUS / DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, LICENSE SUSPENDED FOR DUI - 1ST OFFENSE
2055	DUS / DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, LICENSE SUSPENDED FOR DUI - 2ND OFFENSE
2057	TRAFFIC / UNLAWFUL USE OF LICENSE OR FRAUDULENT APPLICATION FOR LICENSE - 2ND OR SUB. OFFENSE
2099	TRAFFIC / FAILURE TO GIVE INFORMATION AND RENDER AID
2306	ALCOHOL / DRINKING ALCOHOLIC LIQUORS IN PUBLIC CONVEYANCE UNLAWFUL
2349	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD VALUE MORE THAN $500 IN SIX MONTH PERIOD
2350	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD VALUE $500 OR LESS IN SIX MONTH PERIOD, BY ACCEPTOR OF CARD (E.G. STOREOWNER)
2351	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD VALUE MORE THAN $500 IN SIX MONTH PERIOD, BY ACCEPTOR OF CARD (E.G. STOREOWNER)

Continued on next page

WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
2355	FRAUD / WILLFUL SALE OF REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY ON WHICH LIEN EXISTS, VALUE $50 OR MORE
2359	DRUGS / TRAFFICKING IN COCAINE, 28 G OR MORE, BUT LESS THAN 100 G - 1ST OFFENSE
2361	DRUGS / TRAFFICKING IN HEROIN, MORPH., ETC., 4 G OR MORE, BUT LESS THAN 14 G - 1ST OFFENSE
2364	WEAPONS / SALE OR DELIVERY OF PISTOL TO, AND POSSESSION BY, CERTAIN PERSONS UNLAWFUL; STOLEN PISTOL
2369	HABITUAL / HABITUAL OFFENDER, 3RD CONVICTION FOR SERIOUS CRIMES, ENHANCEMENT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT, PER SOLICITOR
2377	PERJURY / PERJURY - FALSE TESTIMONY UNDER OATH
2396	TRAFFIC / FAILURE TO STOP FOR A BLUE LIGHT, NO INJURY OR DEATH - 2ND OR SUB. OFFENSE
2401	HARASSMENT / 2ND DEGREE HARASSMENT
2402	HARASSMENT / 2ND DEGREE HARASSMENT; PRIOR CONVICTION W/N 10YRS, OR WHILE RESTRAINING ORDER OR INJUNCTION IN EFFECT
2403	HARASSMENT / 1ST DEGREE HARASSMENT
2404	HARASSMENT / HARASSMENT 1ST DEGREE, WHEN AN INJUNCTION OR RESTRAINING ORDER IS IN EFFECT PROHIBITING THIS CONDUCT
2406	STALKING / STALKING
2412	GAMBLING / KEEPING GAMING HOUSE
2414	ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT TO FELONY D
2415	ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT TO FELONY E
2416	ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT TO FELONY F
2417	HABITUAL / HABITUAL OFFENDER, 2ND CONVICTION FOR MOST SERIOUS CRIMES, ENHANCEMENT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT
2428	DRUGS / UNLAWFUL TO ADVERTISE FOR SALE, MANUFACTURE, POSSESS, SELL, ETC. PARAPHERNALIA (CIVIL FINE)
2451	COURTS / INTIMIDATION OF COURT OFFICIALS, JURORS, OR WITNESSES (AFTER APRIL 1, 1996)
2458	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY TO PLACE OF WORSHIP (AFTER MAY 29, 1996)
2461	TRAFFIC / HIT AND RUN, DUTIES OF DRIVER INVOLVED IN ACCIDENT WITH MINOR PERSONAL INJURY
2464	TRAFFIC / HIT AND RUN, ATT. VEHICLE, DUTIES OF DRIVER INVOLVED IN ACCIDENT, PROPERTY DAMAGE
2496	ALCOHOL / TITLE 61, ANY VIOLATION WHERE PENALTY IS NOT PROVIDED
2505	WEAPONS / CARRYING CONCEALABLE WEAPON INTO CERTAIN RESTRICTED PLACES
2506	WEAPONS / USE OF FIREARM WHILE UNDER INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS
2513	TRAFFIC / FAILURE TO YIELD RIGHT-OF-WAY TO APPROACHING VEHICLES

Continued on next page

WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
2526	PRISONERS / THROWING OF BODILY FLUIDS BY PRISONER, DETAINEE ON STATE CORRECTIONS OR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, CORRECTIONS EMPLOYEE, OR VISITOR
2527	ESCAPE / ESCAPE, ATTEMPTED ESCAPE OR POSSESS TOOLS TO ESCAPE FROM PRISON, RECAPTURED
2553	TELEPHONE / UNLAWFUL COMMUNICATION (AFTER 07/20/01)
2556	MAGISTRATE / VIOLATION OF RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED IN MAGISTRATE COURT (PERSONAL)
2569	TRAFFIC / FAILURE TO EXERCISE DUE CARE WHILE OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE
2570	ESCAPE / ESCAPE
2584	DRUGS / ADMINISTER, DISTRIBUTE, ETC. SCHED. I(B) OR (C) OR SCHED. II DRUG, LSD, NARCOTIC DRUG - 1ST OFFENSE
2585	DRUGS / ADMINISTER, DISTRIBUTE, ETC. SCHED. I(B) OR (C) OR SCHED. II DRUG, LSD, NARCOTIC DRUG - 2ND OFFENSE
2587	DRUGS / ADMINISTER, DISTRIBUTE, ETC. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A CRIME - 1ST OFFENSE
2597	REPORT / FILING A FALSE POLICE REPORT OF A FELONY VIOLATION
2598	REPORT / FILING A FALSE POLICE REPORT OF A MISDEMEANOR VIOLATION
2601	IMPERSONATING / IMPERSONATING STATE OR LOCAL OFFICIAL IN CONNECTION WITH SHAM LEGAL PROCESS
2604	IMPERSONATING / ASSERT AUTHORITY TO INTIMIDATE OR HINDER OFFICIAL BY THREAT, HARASSMENT, ETC.
2605	THREAT / THREATENING LIFE, PERSON OR FAMILY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
2654	URINE / SELL, GIVE, DISTRIBUTE, MARKET TO DEFEAT DRUG OR ALCOHOL TEST - 1ST OFFENSE
2660	ABUSE / THREAT, INTIMIDATE OR ATTEMPT, ADULT PROTECTION ACT
2665	URINE / ADULTERATE URINE OR BODILY FLUID SAMPLE TO DEFEAT DRUG OR ALCOHOL TEST - 1ST OFFENSE
2667	URINE / POSSESS ADULTERANTS INTENDED TO DEFEAT DRUG OR ALCOHOL TEST - 1ST OFFENSE
2722	GAMBLING / UNLAWFUL POSSESSION/OPERATION OF SLOT, VIDEO, VENDING MACHINE OR GAMBLING DEVICE
2723	GAMBLING / PERSON PLAYING AT A GAMING HOUSE
2735	DRUGS / GAMA HYDROXY BUTYRIC/GHB (DATE DRUG) 50 MG/ML OR MORE, 1ST OFF.
2738	PRESCRIPTION / UNLAWFUL TO POSSESS, DISPOSE OR DISTRIBUTE PRESCRIPTION DRUG OR DEVICE WITHOUT PRESCRIPTION
2757	TAX / EVASION OF A TAX OR PROPERTY ASSESSMENT OR PAYMENT
2765	OBSTRUCTION / OBSTRUCTION OF ADULT PROTECTION INVESTIGATION PER TITLE 43, CHAPTER 35

Continued on next page

WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
2775	BOMB / INTENTION. CAUSE EXPLOSION, AIDS/COUNSEL EXPLOSION RESULT. IN DAMAGE TO BLDG., ATTEMPTS TO INJURE PERSONS/BLDG.
2778	BOMB / HOAX DEVICE OR REPLICA, COMMUNICATION, INTIMIDATION OR THREAT WITH HOAX DEVICE
2780	BOMB / MAKING A BOMB THREAT OR CONVEY. FALSE INFORMATION ABOUT A BOMB THREAT, 1ST OFFENSE
2794	CONTRACTOR / UNLAWFUL PRACTICE OR SUBMITTING FALSE INFO. TO GET A LICENSE
2798	TRAFFIC / STRIKING FIXTURES ON OR ADJACENT TO HIGHWAY - FAILURE TO REPORT
2804	ANIMALS / ILL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS IN GENERAL, TORTURE
2809	TRAFFIC / UNLAWFUL USE OF BLUELIGHT OR EMERGENCY VEHICLE SIGNAL
2813	FINANTC / FINANCIAL IDENTITY FRAUD OR IDENTITY FRAUD
2863	BODY / BODY PIERCING, VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS GOVERNING BODY PIERCING
2869	DETECTIVES / VIOLATIONS CONCERNING PRIVATE DETECTIVES AND PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS
2877	SHOPLIFTING / VALUE $2000 OR LESS (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-01-0057)
2883	CHECKS / FRAUDULENT CHECKS OR STOP PAYMENT >$500 <$1000, 1ST OFFENSE
2897	LOTTERY / SELLING TICKET OR ALLOWING LESS THAN 18 YEARS OLD TO PLAY
2900	LOTTERY / INTENT TO DEFRAUD, COUNTERFEIT GAME TICKETS; ALTER, MAKE, ETC.
2901	LOTTERY / ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE GAME BY COERCION, TAMPERING, DECEPTION, ETC.
2903	LOTTERY / CONSPIRACY
2907	WEAPONS / DISCHARGING FIREARM INTO VEHICLE, AIRCRAFT, ETC. WHILE OCCUPIED
2915	DRUGS / TRAFFICKING IN MDMA OR ECSTASY, 500 DOSAGE UNITS OR MORE, BUT LESS THAN 1000 DOSAGE UNITS OR THE EQUIVALENT, 1ST OFFENSE
2919	POSSESSION OF MDMA OR ECSTASY (15 DOSES OR MORE) 1ST OFFENSE
2920	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF FIFTEEN DOSAGE UNITS OR MORE OF MDMA OR ECSTASY, 2ND OFFENSE
2921	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF FIFTEEN DOSAGE UNITS OF MDMA OR ECSTASY, 3RD OR SUBSEQUENT OFFENSE
2923	DRUGS / THEFT OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, 1ST OFFENSE
2937	BOMB / THREAT, CONSPIRE TO THREAT, SOLICITS ANOTHER TO THREAT REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY
2938	BOMB / PROTECTING PERSON WHO VIOLATES 16-23-720
2946	ATHLETIC / VIOLATION OF ARTICLE CONCERNING STATE ATHLETIC COMMISSION

Continued on next page

WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
2990	MISCELLANEOUS / GENERAL SESSIONS OFFENSE REPEALED AND NOT REPLACED BY A NEW STATUTE. USE ONLY WHERE NO SPECIFIC CODE IS AVAILABLE.
2993	TRAFFIC / NONREGISTERED VEHICLE, FAILURE TO REGISTER OR FALSE STATEMENT
3009	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF LESS THAN ONE GRAM OF METH. OR COCAINE BASE, 1ST OFFENSE
3011	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF COCAINE, 1ST OFFENSE
3012	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF COCAINE, 2ND OFFENSE
3013	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF COCAINE, 3RD OFFENSE
3014	DRUGS / MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. OF COCAINE BASE OR METH 1ST
3015	DRUGS / MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. COCAINE BASE OR METHAMPHETAMINE 2ND OFFENSE
3016	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF LESS THAN ONE GRAM OF METH. OR COCAINE BASE, 3RD OR SUB. OFFENSE
3017	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF LESS THAN ONE GRAM OF METH. OR COCAINE BASE, 2ND OFFENSE
3023	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF EPHEDRINE 9 GRAMS < 28 GRAMS, 1ST OFFENSE
3028	DRUGS / POSSESSION OF EPHEDRINE 28 GRAMS < 100 GRAMS, 3RD OFFENSE
3039	DRUGS / MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. OF COCAINE BASE OR METHAMPHETAMINE, 3RD OR SUB. OFFENSE
3049	HARASSMENT / 2ND DEGREE HARASSMENT; USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION OR LICENSING INFO. IN FURTHERANCE OF THE CRIME
3056	DOMESTIC / VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER OF PROTECTION
3106	LOOTING / UNAUTHORIZED PROPERTY ENTRANCE, PROPERTY DAMAGE, TAKE POSSESSION OR DISTURB PROPERTY OF ANOTHER
3110	COMPUTER / COMPUTER CRIME ACT, VALUE EXCEEDS $10,000 - FIRST DEGREE
3111	COMPUTER / COMPUTER CRIME ACT, VALUE MORE THAN $1,000, UP TO $10,000, SECOND DEGREE - 2ND OFFENSE
3112	COMPUTER / COMPUTER CRIME ACT, VALUE MORE THAN $1,000, UP TO $10,000, SECOND DEGREE - 1ST OFFENSE
3128	DRUGS / DIST. OTHER THAN LISTED IN SCHEDULES I THRU V; EXCLUDING I(B),(C), LSD AND SCHEDULE II DRUGS
3140	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD - REPORT OR THEFT, LOSS OR NON-RECEIPT
3179	BANKING / VIOLATION OR BANK DEPOSITS CHAPTER VALUE >$1000 - $5000 - 1ST OFFENSE
3198	DRUGS / MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. OF METHAMPHETAMINE, 1ST
3199	DRUGS / MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. OF METHAMPHETAMINE, 2ND

Continued on next page

WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
3200	DRUGS / MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. OF METHAMPHETAMINE, 3RD OR SUB.
3202	WEAPONS / UNLAWFUL TAKING OF FIREARM OR WEAPON FROM A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
3208	ID / IDENTITY FRAUD TO OBTAIN EMPLOYMENT OR AVOID DETECTION BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
3214	SHOPLIFTING / VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 AND LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3215	DRUGS / UNLAWFUL MANUFACTURE OF METHAMPHETAMINE IN THE PRESENCE OF A MINOR CHILD, 1ST OFFENSE
3216	DRUGS / UNLAWFUL MANUFACTURE OF METHAMPHETAMINE IN THE PRESENCE OF A MINOR CHILD, 2ND OFFENSE
3224	TRAFFIC / LEAVING THE SCENE OF ACCIDENT INVOLVING UNATTENDED VEHICLE
3268	DRUGS / EPHEDRINE OR PSEUDOEPHEDRINE – POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION OR INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, ETC. ALTERED FROM ORIGINAL CONDITION, 1ST OFFENSE
3273	VANDALISM / ILLEGAL GRAFFITI VANDALISM
3274	VANDALISM / ILLEGAL GRAFFITI VANDALISM, 2ND OFFENSE
3281	VIOLATION / WILFUL VIOLATION OF TERM OR CONDITION OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING
3282	DRUGS / DISPOSAL OR ASSISTING DISPOSAL OF METHAMPHETAMINE WASTE, 1ST OFFENSE
3307	TRADEMARKS / TRANSPORT, TRANSFER, DISTRIBUTE OR SELL A COUNTERFEIT ITEM, WITH A VALUE OF $2000 OR LESS, 1ST OFFENSE
3308	TRADEMARKS / TRANSPORT, TRANSFER, DISTRIBUTE OR SELL A COUNTERFEIT ITEM, WITH A VALUE OF MORE THAN $2000 BUT LESS THAN $10000, 1ST OFFENSE
3311	TRADEMARKS / TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT MARKS, GOODS OR SERVICES VALUED AT $50,000 OR MORE, 1ST OFFENSE
3314	TRAFFIC / UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE FEE VIOLATION, 3RD AND SUBSEQUENT
3329	PROBATION / VIOLATION OF TERMS OF PROBATION, PAROLE OR OTHER SUPERVISORY PROGRAM
3330	ANIMALS / CRUELTY TO POLICE DOG OR HORSE
3336	FIREARMS / POSSESSION, PURCHASE, SALE, OR TRANSPORT BY AN UNLAWFUL ALIEN
3360	ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT TO AN EXEMPT FELONY
3386	CHECKS / FRAUDULENT USE OF CHECKS, OR STOP PAYMENT, MORE THAN $5,000 - 1ST OFFENSE
3409	WILDLIFE / HUNTING OR FISHING WHILE UNDER SUSPENSION
3413	ASSAULT / ASSAULT & BATTERY 2ND DEGREE
3415	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY TO ANIMALS, PERSONAL PROPERTY, INJURY VALUE $2,000 OR LESS

Continued on next page

WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
3416	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY TO ANIMALS, PERSONAL PROPERTY, INJURY VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000
3417	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY TO ANIMALS, PERSONAL PROPERTY, INJURY VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3418	DNA / DESTROYING, ALTERING, CONCEALING, OR TAMPERING WITH PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OR BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL
3419	LARCENY / PETIT OR SIMPLE LARCENY - $2,000 OR LESS
3420	LARCENY / GRAND LARCENY, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000
3421	LARCENY / GRAND LARCENY, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3422	BREACH / BREACH OF TRUST WITH FRAUDULENT INTENT, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS
3423	BREACH / BREACH OF TRUST WITH FRAUDULENT INTENT, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000
3424	BREACH / BREACH OF TRUST WITH FRAUDULENT INTENT, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3425	RSG / RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS
3427	RSG / RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3428	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY TO TREE, HOUSE; TRESPASS UPON REAL PROPERTY, INJURY VALUE $2,000 OR LESS
3429	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY TO TREE, HOUSE; TRESPASS UPON REAL PROPERTY, INJURY VALUE MORE THAN $2,000, BUT LESS THAN $10,000
3430	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY TO TREE, HOUSE; TRESPASS UPON REAL PROPERTY, INJURY VALUE MORE THAN $10,000
3434	WEAPONS / POSSESSION OF FIREARM OR AMMUNITION BY PERSON CONVICTED OF VIOLENT FELONY
3436	FORGERY / FORGERY, VALUE LESS THAN $10,000
3437	FORGERY / FORGERY, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3453	LARCENY / VESSELS, BOATS, CANOES AND EQUIP., STEALING OF, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000
3454	LARCENY / VESSELS, BOATS, CANOES, AND EQUIPMENT, STEALING OF, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3458	LARCENY / LARCENY OF BICYCLES, VALUE $2,000 OR MORE
3459	EMBEZZLEMENT / EMBEZZLEMENT OF PUBLIC FUNDS, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3460	EMBEZZLEMENT / EMBEZZLEMENT OF PUBLIC FUNDS, VALUE LESS THAN $10,000
3461	ARREST / INTERFERENCE, HINDERING OFFICERS SERVING WARRANT OR RESCUING PRISONERS
3466	VEHICLE / POSS., CONCEAL, SELL., OR DISPOSE OF STOLEN VEHICLE, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS
3467	VEHICLE / POSS., CONCEAL, SELL., OR DISPOSE OF STOLEN VEHICLE, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000

Continued on next page

WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
3468	VEHICLE / POSS., CONCEAL, SELL., OR DISPOSE OF STOLEN VEHICLE, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3469	BREACH / OBTAIN SIGNATURE OR PROP. UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS
3470	BREACH / OBTAIN SIGNATURE OR PROP. UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000
3471	BREACH / OBTAIN SIGNATURE OR PROP. UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3472	BREACH / BREACH OF TRUST, OBTAINING PROPERTY UNDER FALSE TOKENS, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS
3473	BREACH / BREACH OF TRUST, OBTAINING PROPERTY UNDER FALSE TOKENS, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000, BUT LESS THAN $10,000
3474	BREACH / BREACH OF TRUST, OBTAINING PROPERTY UNDER FALSE TOKENS, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3479	LARCENY / FAILURE TO RETURN RENTED OBJECTS, FRAUDULENT APPROPRIATION, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS
3480	LARCENY / FAILURE TO RETURN RENTED OBJECTS, FRAUD. APPROPRIATION, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000, BUT LESS THAN $10,000
3481	LARCENY / FAILURE TO RETURN RENTED OBJECTS, FRAUDULENT APPROPRIATION, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3483	FOOD / FOOD STAMPS, FRAUDULENT ACQUISITION OR USE OF, VALUE OF MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000
3484	FOOD / FOOD STAMPS, FRAUDULENT ACQUISITION OR USE OF, VALUE OF $10,000 OR MORE
3486	FINANTC / CRIMINALLY RECEIVE GOODS, SERVICES FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED, VALUE MORE THAN $1,000 IN ANY SIX MONTH PERIOD
3487	GRAVES / THEFT OR INJURY OF GRAVE PROPERTY, LESS THAN $400
3510	INSURANCE / PRESENTING FALSE CLAIM FOR INSURANCE PAYMENT, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3533	TATTOO / MISC. VIOLATIONS OF TITLE 44, CHAPTER 34
3552	INSURANCE / FALSE STATEMENT, MISREP., OR ASSISTING, ABETTING, SOLICITING, OR CONSPIRING - 1ST OFFENSE, $10,000 OR MORE BUT LESS THAN $50,000
3554	MISCELLANEOUS / GENERAL SESSIONS MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE WHERE NO PUNISHMENT PROVIDED BY STATUTE
3564	METALS / INJURY TO REAL PROPERTY, FIXTURES OR IMPROVEMENTS TO OBTAIN NONFERROUS METALS, DAMAGE OF LESS THAN $5,000
3565	METALS / INJURY TO REAL PROPERTY, FIXTURES OR IMPROVEMENTS TO OBTAIN NONFERROUS METALS, DAMAGE OF $5,000 OR MORE
3566	METALS / OBTAINING NONFERROUS METALS, DISRUPTION OF SERVICE TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OR MORE THAN 10 CUSTOMERS
3568	METALS / OBTAINING PERMIT FOR PURPOSE OF TRANSPORTING OR SELLING STOLEN NONFERROUS METALS

Continued on next page

WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
3569	METALS / UNLAWFUL PURCHASE OF NONFERROUS METALS FOR PURPOSE OF RECYCLING THE METALS, 1ST OFFENSE
3572	METALS / UNLAWFUL SALE OF NONFERROUS METALS - 1ST OFFENSE
3582	METALS / UNLAWFUL TRANSPORTATION / POSSESSION OF NONFERROUS METALS IN VEHICLE, 1ST OFFENSE
3585	METALS / TRANSPORTATION OR POSSESSION OF STOLEN NONFERROUS METALS
3587	LARCENY / GRAND LARCENY, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3588	BREACH / BREACH OF TRUST WITH FRAUDULENT INTENT, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3589	FINANTC / CRIMINALLY RECEIVE GOODS, SERVICES FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED, VALUE $1,000 OR LESS IN ANY SIX MONTH PERIOD (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3590	BREACH / BREACH OF TRUST WITH FRAUDULENT INTENT, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3591	BREACH / OBTAIN SIGNATURE OR PROP. UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3592	FINANTC / CRIMINALLY RECEIVE GOODS, SERVICES FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED, VALUE MORE THAN $1,000 IN ANY SIX MONTH PERIOD (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3593	BREACH / BREACH OF TRUST, OBTAINING PROPERTY UNDER FALSE TOKENS, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3594	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY TO ANIMALS, PERSONAL PROPERTY, INJURY VALUE $2,000 OR LESS (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3595	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY TO ANIMALS, PERSONAL PROPERTY, INJURY VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3596	LARCENY / PETIT OR SIMPLE LARCENY - $2,000 OR LESS (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3597	BREACH / BREACH OF TRUST, OBTAINING PROPERTY UNDER FALSE TOKENS, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000, BUT LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3598	RSG / RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3599	RSG / RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3600	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY TO TREE, HOUSE; TRESPASS UPON REAL PROPERTY, INJURY VALUE MORE THAN $2,000, BUT LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3604	CHECKS / FRAUDULENT CHECKS OR STOP PAYMENT >$500 <$1000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)

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WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
3605	CHECKS / FRAUDULENT CHECK, OR STOP PAYMENT, >$1000.00 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3606	CHECKS / FRAUDULENT USE OF CHECKS, OR STOP PAYMENT, MORE THAN $5,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3612	FORGERY / FORGERY, VALUE LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3613	BREACH / OBTAIN SIGNATURE OR PROP. UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3614	VEHICLE / POSS., CONCEAL, SELL., OR DISPOSE OF STOLEN VEHICLE, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3615	VEHICLE / POSS., CONCEAL, SELL., OR DISPOSE OF STOLEN VEHICLE, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3621	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD VALUE $500 OR LESS IN SIX MONTH PERIOD (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3622	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD VALUE MORE THAN $500 IN SIX MONTH PERIOD (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3623	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD VALUE $500 OR LESS IN SIX MONTH PERIOD, BY ACCEPTOR OF CARD (E.G. STOREOWNER) (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3624	FINANTC / FINANCIAL TRANSACTION CARD FRAUD VALUE MORE THAN $500 IN SIX MONTH PERIOD, BY ACCEPTOR OF CARD (E.G. STOREOWNER) (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3634	LARCENY / LARCENY OF BICYCLES, VALUE LESS THAN $2,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3635	LARCENY / FAILURE TO RETURN RENTED OBJECTS, FRAUD. APPROPRIATION, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000, BUT LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3655	TRAFFIC / DRIVING COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED, REVOKED, CANCELED OR DISQUALIFIED, NON DUI RELATED - 1ST OFFENSE
3663	METALS / FALSIFYING INFORMATION ON APPLICATION, FORM OR AFFIDAVIT REQUIRED UNDER 56-5-5670
3685	MALICIOUS / MALICIOUS INJURY TO TREE, HOUSE; TRESPASS UPON REAL PROPERTY, INJURY VALUE LESS THAN $2,000 OR LESS (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3686	DRUGS / ATTEMPT TO POSSESS UNLAWFUL SUBSTANCE, TITLE 44, CHAPTER 53, ARTICLE 3
3691	VIOLATION / REMOVING, TAMPERING WITH, ALTERING OR DESTROYING ELECTRONIC MONITORING DEVICE
3696	UTILITIES / ALTERING, TAMPERING, BYPASSING UTILITY METERS FOR PROFIT - 2ND OFFENSE

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WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
3737	LARCENY / OBTAINING OR ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN A MERCHANT REFUND USING FALSE OR ALTERED IDENTIFICATION CARD (VALUE LESS THAN $2,000)
3740	RSG / RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000
3741	RSG / RECEIVING GOODS, REPRESENTED AS STOLEN, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS
3742	RSG / RECEIVING GOODS, REPRESENTED AS STOLEN, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000
3743	RSG / RECEIVING GOODS, REPRESENTED AS STOLEN, VALUE $10,000 OR MORE
3744	RSG / RECEIVING GOODS, REPRESENTED AS STOLEN, VALUE $2,000 OR LESS (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3745	RSG / RECEIVING GOODS, REPRESENTED AS STOLEN, VALUE MORE THAN $2,000 BUT LESS THAN $10,000 (ENHANCEMENT PER 16-1-57)
3750	LARCENY / RETAIL THEFT, VALUE OVER $2,000 IN 90 DAYS, 1ST OFFENSE
3752	LARCENY / CONSPIRE WITH ANOTHER TO COMMIT RETAIL THEFT, VALUE OVER $2,000 AGGREGATED OVER 90 DAYS, 1ST OFFENSE
3754	RSG / UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR SALE OF STOLEN RETAIL PROPERTY, FIRST OFFENSE
3756	WEAPONS / ADDITIONAL PENALTY TO 16-11-330 & 16-23-460 FOR GUN ON PREMISES WHERE ALCOHOL SOLD
3757	WEAPONS / UNLAWFUL CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL WHILE CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPON
3758	WEAPONS / CARRYING WEAPON IN BUSINESS PROHIBITING CONCEALED WEAPON
3761	MEDICINE / UNLAWFULLY PRACTICING MEDICINE OR OSTEOPATHY; OR SUBMITTING FALSE INFORMATION TO OBTAIN LICENSE
3769	PRISONERS / REMOVING, DESTROYING, OR CIRCUMVENTING OPERATION OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING DEVICE
3776	DRUGS / MANUFACTURE METH, 1ST
3777	DRUGS / MANUFACTURE METH, 2ND
3778	DRUGS / MANUFACTURE METH, 3RD OR SUB. OFFENSE
3782	RAILROAD / PURCHASING, SELLING, TRANSPORTING RAILROAD TRACK MATERIAL FOR RECYCLING, 1ST
3789	ANIMALS / ILL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, IN GENERAL, OVERWORKING, 1ST OFFENSE
3790	ANIMALS / ILL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, IN GENERAL, OVERWORKING, 2ND OR SUB
3798	DUS / DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION, LICENSE NOT SUSPENDED FOR DUI - 3RD OR SUB. OFFENSE
3803	TRAFFIC / OPERATION OF A VEHICLE WITHOUT IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICE, 1ST OFFENSE
3812	DOMESTIC / DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2ND DEGREE

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WORKING PAPER

Table 21 – continued from previous page

CDR Code	Description
3815	WEAPONS / UNLAWFUL FOR PERSON CONVICTED OF DV 1ST DEGREE, AHAN, ETC., TO SHIP, TRANSPORT, POSSESS OR RECEIVE FIREARM OR AMMUNITION
3816	WEAPONS / UNLAWFUL FOR PERSON CONVICTED OF DV 2ND & 3RD DEGREE, ETC., TO SHIP, TRANSPORT, POSSESS OR RECEIVE FIREARM OR AMMUNITION
3818	DOMESTIC / VIOLATION OF PERMANENT RESTRAINING ORDER (FELONY UNDERLYING CONVICTION)
3819	DOMESTIC / VIOLATION OF PERMANENT RESTRAINING ORDER (MISDEMEANOR UNDERLYING CONVICTION)
3820	DOMESTIC / VIOLATION OF EMERGENCY RESTRAINING ORDER (FELONY UNDERLYING CONVICTION)
3850	WILDLIFE / NIGHT HUNTING FOR ANIMAL NOT LISTED IN 50-11-705(C), 50-11-710, OR 50-11-715 - 1ST OFFENSE
3853	WILDLIFE / NIGHT HUNTING FOR DEER, BEAR, OR TURKEY ON PROPERTY NOT REGISTERED - 1ST OFFENSE
3862	WILDLIFE / ILLEGAL NIGHT HUNTING OF RACCOONS, OPOSSUMS, FOXES, MINKS, OR SKUNKS - 1ST OFFENSE
3893	SCHOOL / NONSTUDENT INTERFERING, DISRUPTING, OR DISTURBING SCHOOLS
9000	MUNICIPAL / VIOLATION OF CITY ORDINANCE (USE STATE CODE IF POSSIBLE)
9003	TRAFFIC / CARELESS OR NEGLIGENT DRIVING (COUNTY/CITY ORDINANCE)
9004	COUNTY / VIOLATION OF COUNTY ORDINANCE (USE STATE CODE IF POSSIBLE)

D.2 Screening policy and workflow

Screeners used written intake guidelines to review eligible cases using law enforcement incident reports and defendants' criminal histories. These guidelines governed whether a case should be dismissed, remanded to a lower court, or returned to the ordinary prosecution workflow. The screening guidelines are reproduced below.

WORKING PAPER

Objective

This document outlines guidelines for the Ninth Circuit Solicitor's Office as well as describes how the screeners will screen cases in the office. Guidelines implemented as part of the screening process are subject to a rigorous data evaluation and thus are included as part of a Randomized Control Trial. Red highlighted text indicates adjustments to Karpel.

Screening Guidelines

1. Upon review of the arrest report, all warrants with facially insufficient evidence should be dismissed.

    a. The screener will have authority, upon review of relevant evidence i.e. the arrest report, to dismiss a case for insufficient evidence. The screener will enter "dismiss for insufficient evidence" in the disposition code and dismiss the case.
    b. Where appropriate, the screening attorney will note the case as an example of insufficient evidence to provide to police.

2. Where discovery is not provided within 30 days of the arrest, absent a demonstrated public safety concern, the screener will dismiss the warrant regardless of other pending charges for the defendant.

    a. Where a case is more than 30 days old and still lacks the necessary paperwork, the screener will enter "No Discovery Received" in the disposition code and dismiss the case.
    b. The screening attorney should notify the arresting officer or agency of the dismissal.

3. Screening attorneys have authority to use their discretion to dismiss cases in the interest of justice. Screening attorneys should consider the seriousness of the conduct, the arrestees' criminal history, and the context of the arrest.

    a. The screening attorney may notify the arresting officer or agency of their reasoning for dismissing the case.

4. The screening attorney may note recommended plea offers for the prosecuting attorney as a "screening note."

5. The screening attorney will review the current incident report for indicia of mental health issues. Where the screener finds the arrestee has a prior mental health evaluation or may need an evaluation, the screener will create a screening note detailing the issue for the prosecuting attorney.

    a. The Case Management Team will add a screening note type for these and other screener notes.

WORKING PAPER

6. Property offenses should be reviewed and analyzed using the following criteria

    a. Factors that weigh towards remanding the case:
        i. Where the value of the goods is $250 or less;
        ii. Where the priors are very remote in time e.g. fraudulent checks from 20 years ago;
        iii. Where the individual's RAP is minimal;
        iv. Where the priors are misdemeanors and not serious felonies;
        v. Where the priors are from outside South Carolina –since the burden, if challenged, is on the State to "prove up" the priors for enhancement.
    b. Factors that weigh towards prosecuting the enhancement:
        i. The arrestee has other, pending charges in the jurisdiction or elsewhere;
        ii. The arrestee is a "frequent-flyer";
        iii. The arrestee was on probation at the time of the screened offense – as determined by the RAP sheet and/or calling PPP (843-740-1553);
        iv. Whether the arrestee was recently arrested such that these offenses indicate a pattern of nuisance.
    c. The screening attorney should consider whether the arrestee is a candidate for diversionary programs such as PTI, MHC, Drug Court, and Veterans Court by reviewing their record as a frequent flyer in summary court or other indicators that the individual has drug or mental health issues. If identified, the screening attorney will add a screening note for the prosecuting attorney that diversion should be considered.
    d. The screening attorney should not immediately remand cases as the arrestee may have pending unserved arrest warrants from other nearby police departments. The screener should allow 10 business days for other departments to serve arrestees.

7. The screening attorney should dismiss "mischarged" gun possession charges and multi-defendant gun charges where there is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt against the given defendant.

    a. Screening attorney will review arrest reports and where there is evidence that a specific defendant possessed the gun, the screening attorney will articulate that evidence in a case note.

8. Absent a demonstrated public safety concern, Habitual Traffic Offenses should be remanded.

    a. Screening attorney will review the arrest report and the defendant's prior criminal history. Where there are articulable public safety concerns to NOT remand the case, the screening attorney will write a note detailing these reasons as a screening note for the prosecuting attorney. Otherwise, the screening attorney will remand the case.

9. Hit and run and Failure to stop for blue light traffic offenses without additional aggravating circumstances should result in a PTI offer. Where the screening attorney cannot extend a PTI offer because there is not a defense counsel or there are other issues preventing the

WORKING PAPER

offer, the screening attorney will enter a screening note for the prosecuting attorney to extend a PTI offer when possible.

a. Aggravating circumstances for Hit and Run cases
    i. Whether there is a victim and what the victim's stated desires are in prosecution versus PTI/non-prosecution.
    ii. Presence of drugs or guns.
    iii. Children or other vulnerable people in the car.
    iv. Fleeing another crime.
    v. Speed in the context of the road environment e.g. city versus country road.
    vi. Driver impairment e.g. drunkenness.
b. Mitigating circumstances for Hit and Run cases
    i. Young driver.
    ii. First time offense.
    iii. No other accompanying offense.
    iv. Light property damage.
    v. Weather or lighting conditions that might have made driving difficult.
c. Aggravating circumstances for Failure to Stop for Blue Light cases
    i. Speed in the context of the road environment e.g. city versus country road.
    ii. Length of time and distance of the pursuit.
    iii. Presence of drugs or guns.
    iv. Children or other vulnerable people in the car.
    v. Fleeing another crime.
    vi. Driver impairment e.g. drunkenness.
    vii. Fleeing after the stop.
d. Mitigating circumstances for Failure to Stop for Blue Light cases
    i. Young driver.
    ii. First time offense.
    iii. No other accompanying offense.
    iv. Person drives to a safe place before stopping e.g. home. Appropriate for PTI.

WORKING PAPER

D.3 Sample context and assignment over time

Table 22 describes Charleston County cases referred to SOL9 and compares the screening-eligible and ineligible subsets. It reports caseloads, referring agencies, charge composition, case processing, defendant characteristics, and prosecutor coverage. These descriptive comparisons characterize the population covered by the intervention. Treatment–control balance within the analysis sample is reported separately in Table 1 in the main text.

Figure 13 reports the share of eligible cases assigned to screening in each month. The share remains close to one-half across the enrollment period, providing suggestive evidence that treatment assignment was stable over time.




Figure 13: Assignment shares by month

WORKING PAPER

Table 22: Descriptive statistics for Charleston County and experimental subsample

	Full Sample	RCT-Eligible	RCT-Ineligible
Panel A: Caseload			
Monthly referrals, mean	417.0	298.1	118.8
Monthly referrals, SD	32.3	25.1	18.3
Cases with ≥1 co-defendant (%)	13.5	12.0	17.4
Panel B: Law Enforcement Agencies			
Agency NCPD (%)	32.5	33.3	30.4
Agency CPD (%)	32.4	35.4	24.8
Agency CCSO (%)	19.1	19.9	17.0
Agency MPPD (%)	10.0	11.4	6.6
Other agencies (%)	6.1	0.0	21.3
Panel C: Case Mix			
Felony (%)	67.6	62.9	79.3
Offense type (%):			
Property	23.6	29.9	7.9
Drug	26.2	28.3	20.9
Domestic violence	8.6	7.4	11.7
Person	13.0	4.5	34.3
Guns	10.1	11.1	7.8
Traffic	11.5	10.7	13.3
Other	7.0	8.2	4.1
gun case (%)	16.4	13.3	24.2
drug case (%)	29.4	31.2	25.1
victim case (%)	37.2	36.6	38.7
Panel D: Case Flow			
Day of arrest (%):			
Monday	13	14	12
Tuesday	15	15	15
Wednesday	15	15	15
Thursday	16	16	17
Friday	17	17	18
Saturday	13	14	12
Sunday	10	10	10
Dismissal within 60 days (%)	2.7	3.3	1.2
Remand within 60 days (%)	1.1	1.5	0.1
Time-to-disposition (days):			
Median	306	292	353
25th percentile	163	153	195
75th percentile	543	526	593
Panel E: Defendant Profile			
Age, mean (years)	36.2	36.2	35.6
Age, SD (years)	12.3	12.2	12.1
Female (%)	20.1	19.3	19.8
Race/ethnicity (%):			
White	34.4	33.3	35.1
Black	60.2	61.8	59.2
Hispanic/Latino	4.4	4.1	4.6
Other	0.9	0.8	1.1
Any prior convictions (%)	39.3	42.3	37.6
Panel F: Staffing			
Unique prosecutors	66	59	65
Sample Size			
Defendants	7,567	5,450	2,640
Cases	10,007	7,155	2,852
Charges	15,317	9,455	5,862

Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for Charleston County cases between May 1, 2023, and April 30, 2025, split by screening eligibility. Offense categories are based on each case's top charge, whereas the gun and drug indicators identify whether any charge in the case falls into the corresponding category. Defendant-level statistics (age, sex, race, and prior convictions) are calculated at the unique-defendant level; other statistics are reported at the case level unless otherwise indicated. Time-to-disposition quantiles are calculated among cases with observed dispositions. The eligible sample contains 7,155 cases before the demographic restrictions described in Section 2.3, which leave 6,949 cases for analysis.

WORKING PAPER

E Appendix: Punishment Burden Calculations

E.1 Incarceration and Probation

This appendix documents the accounting used to estimate the impact on pre- and post-disposition detention and probation. Net incarceration is a composite of pre- and post-disposition detention. All quantities are reported as Control minus Treatment, so positive values indicate lower punishment burden under screening. We exclude fines because they are rare in the observed data and measured noisily. These estimates should be interpreted as illustrative accounting rather than as a complete welfare analysis: they do not price every social cost or benefit, they do not model general-equilibrium responses, and they do not measure longer-run defendant outcomes.

Table 23 reports control and treatment arm means alongside regression-adjusted ITT estimates for each punishment-burden component. Consistent with the direction of the time savings and dispositional changes of the main findings, treated cases have lower point estimates for every component relative to control cases. The regression-adjusted differences range from 3.49 days per case for pre-disposition jail to 13+ days for every other component (though all are individually imprecise with p-values ranging from 0.14 to 0.45).

Net incarceration is reported alongside its two components — pretrial jail and post-disposition incarceration — to capture the full custodial burden for defendants whose cases proceed to conviction. For defendants whose cases are dismissed without a plea or remanded, punishment exposure consists of pre-disposition jail time only. For defendants who plead, total custodial exposure includes both pre-disposition jail time and post-disposition incarceration. Reporting the components separately avoids double-counting: pre-disposition jail and post-disposition incarceration are mutually exclusive portions of net incarceration time, and their sum equals the net incarceration figure.

Table 23: Punishment burden summary

Outcome	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	Adj. Diff. (C-T)	Clustered SE	95% CI	p-value
Pre-Disposition Incarceration	70.98	65.32	3.49	4.20	[-4.74, 11.72]	0.405
Post-Disposition Incarceration	121.39	102.43	13.39	17.89	[-21.68, 48.46]	0.454
Net Incarceration	192.36	167.75	16.89	18.95	[-20.25, 54.03]	0.373
Probation / Supervision	237.44	212.45	22.50	15.39	[-7.66, 52.66]	0.144

Notes: Means use the same formula-complete estimation sample as the adjusted ITT regressions. Coefficients are reported in control-minus-treatment orientation, so positive values indicate screening lowers punishment exposure. Standard errors are clustered at the defendant level. Significance markers: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

The ITT estimates underlying the punishment-burden components (pre-disposition jail[11], post-disposition incarceration, probation) are individually imprecise; they should

[11] While the median defendant spends 1 day in pre-disposition jail, the distribution has a long right tail with a small subset held for long periods that drives the mean of 70.98 days and makes the estimate noisy.

WORKING PAPER

therefore be read as central-scenario accounting. Since the effect range for all estimates includes zero, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference between experimental groups. The interval is consistent with effects ranging from a 16.5% reduction to a 6.7% increase relative to the control mean in pre-disposition incarceration. Similarly, the ranges for post-disposition incarceration and probation in Table 23 range from smaller increases to larger reductions.

Screening reduces guilty pleas and increases early non-prosecution decisions relative to business as usual. This suggests that the timing of review, and not only the strength of the case, shapes plea outcomes. These outcomes bear on a core constitutional interest. Freedom from physical restraint lies at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and pretrial detention is "the carefully limited exception."[12] The State may hold a defendant before disposition on a judicial finding of probable cause and, where authorized, on findings that release would endanger the public or risk flight.[13] These are thresholds for holding someone, not findings that a case merits prosecution, so detention can be lawful even in cases the State declines to prosecute. By identifying the cases the office declines to prosecute and disposing of them sooner, screening spares some defendants the conviction and any sentence that a plea would have produced. For defendants who would otherwise have remained in custody until their case ended, an earlier non-prosecution decision also means an earlier release. The carceral estimates above are consistent with this mechanism, though they cannot rule out no change. Screening thus moves practice closer to the principle that pretrial detention should be the exception, shortening prosecution, and plausibly detention, in cases the State ultimately does not pursue.

E.2 Distributional Incidence and Race

The main text does not claim that screening has sharply different treatment effects by race within the prosecutor's office. Instead, it emphasizes that broadly similar effects across race can have unequal aggregate consequences because upstream exposure to arrest and prosecution differs across racial groups. The tables below summarize eligible-case composition by race and translate the pooled punishment-burden estimates into race-specific aggregate incidence using treatment-arm case counts.

WORKING PAPER

[12] Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (construing the parallel Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).

[13] Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749–751. See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972) (identifying the prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration as an interest protected by the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right).

Table 24: Appendix-only exploratory hypothesis H6: aggregate racial incidence of punishment-burden reduction

Race	Eligible cases	Eligible share	Treatment cases	Implied jail reduction	Implied incarceration reduction	Implied probation reduction	Implied total reduction
Black	4,596	66.1%	2,252	5,427.0	14,461.0	21,924.6	41,812.6
White	2,353	33.9%	1,155	2,783.4	7,416.7	11,244.6	21,444.8

Notes: This appendix-only table is exploratory and does not alter the paper's core estimands. The implied aggregate reductions multiply pooled treatment effects from the paper's punishment-burden specification by race-specific treatment-arm case counts, so the table should be read as exposure-weighted incidence rather than treatment-effect heterogeneity.

Table 25: Appendix-only case mix by race in the eligible sample

Characteristic	Black	White	Difference
Felony charge	65.0%	62.5%	2.6%**
Gun charge	18.4%	5.3%	13.2%***
Drug charge	31.1%	33.3%	-2.2%*
Victim-involved case	32.7%	42.7%	-10.0%***
Pending prior arrest	33.3%	29.5%	3.7%***
Multi-defendant case	12.2%	12.6%	-0.4%
No prior convictions	44.3%	58.5%	-14.2%***
1 prior conviction	12.8%	10.8%	2.0%**
2 prior convictions	10.4%	7.3%	3.1%***
3 prior convictions	7.6%	5.5%	2.1%***
4 prior convictions	6.5%	4.6%	1.9%***
5–6 prior convictions	7.7%	5.3%	2.4%***
7+ prior convictions	10.7%	8.0%	2.7%***
Private defense attorney	26.8%	33.1%	-6.3%***
N (cases)	4,596	2,353	

Notes: Eligible sample restricted to the notebook's plea-analysis ITT sample with Race in Black, White and Gender in Male, Female. Rows report pre-treatment case-mix and upstream-exposure characteristics used elsewhere in the paper, including the repo-standard multi-defendant and prior-conviction indicators. Pending prior arrest is 1 for prior-arrest and prior-and-subsequent categories; subsequent-only and no-other-arrests categories are 0. Multi-defendant case uses the repo-standard codefs indicator when present. Differences test Black vs. White means: $^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$.

WORKING PAPER